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Abstract 
This paper incorporates Porter’s diamond model to analyze China’s 
automobile industry. Besides looking at the four determinants of competitiveness in 
the original model, this study specifically examines the impact of government on 
industry competitiveness.  
This study retrieves archival data on multi-measurements used in prior studies. 
The author incorporates one case study of a Chinese auto firm to illustrate the specific 
impact of government policy and the responses of auto assemblers and component 
suppliers. Interviews with experts in auto-related industries are conducted to 
triangulate the findings. 
Results show that the Chinese auto industry is still in its early stages of 
development, whereas product quality and economies of scale of domestic 
automakers are approaching global standards; thus Chinese auto firms aim at 
becoming major players in the international market. The government plays an active 
role in assisting the industry development as the nation transitions from a planned 
economy to a free market. 
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1. Introduction 
Global competitiveness has become a topic for mainstream research in both 
academic and practical fields. Porter’s (1990) diamond model is a well-known theory 
on competitiveness, which analyzes national (or industry) competitiveness through 
four major dimensions: factor conditions, demand conditions, firm strategy structure 
and rivalry, and related and supporting industries. 
However, Porter’s model was developed in the early 1990s using data from 
advanced nations; as emerging economies play a more important role in world trade, a 
number of scholars have questioned the applicability of the diamond model in a 
global context, especially in developing and/or emerging economies (Bellak & Weiss 
1993; Cartwright, 1993; Dunning, 1980, 1993; Hodgetts, 1993; O’Malley & 
O’Gorman, 2001; Oz, 2002; Rugman & D’Cruz, 1993; Rugman & Verbeke, 1993a). 
Recent studies on emerging nations’ competitiveness have modified the diamond 
model according to various national and/or industry characteristics (Barragan, 2005; 
Hughes & Hare, 1994; Moon & Lee, 2004; O’Malley & O’Gorman, 2001); however, 
no studies have examined the People’s Republic of China, a growing economic power, 
through Porter’s dimensions. Thus, this study applies Porter’s diamond model to 
identify sources of competitiveness in China’s auto industry. 
China’s auto industry, increasingly being headlined in major trade journals, 
attracts much attention in both strategic and academic fields. There are those that 
predicted China will compete well in exporting automobiles to the North American 
market in less than five years (“Mixed outlook for auto exports.”, 2005), while others 
stated that China is not ready for export and the biggest sources of competitiveness, 
cost-benefits and consumer market, still lie in the domestic market (Mackey, 2005). 
Are Chinese automakers ready to face international competition? Are there sufficient 
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industry policies to support internationalization? What is the reaction of global auto 
firms, given a huge attractive market and growing domestic competitors? The 
motivation of the current study is thus to understand the real competitive position of 
China’s automobile industry—one of its pillar industries—as the nation transitions 
from a centrally-planned and protected economy to a free market. 
To date, analyses of China’s auto industry are mostly based on secondary data 
from academic and professional sources. In this study, the author incorporates case 
study facts about Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation-SAIC and its foreign 
partners, so as to analyze the performance of an indigenous auto firm. Supporting 
industries, firm strategy and the impact of government are the focal areas of this study. 
Finally, interview data from scholars, policy makers, and business practitioners are 
collected for confirmative purpose. 
Contributions of the current study are threefold: first, the analysis of China’s 
auto industry will fill a literature gap in applying the diamond model in one of 
China’s pillar industries; secondly, this study can offer policy implications by 
analyzing significant government impacts on auto industry prosperity in a transition 
economy; and finally, understanding the industry could benefit strategic decision 
making for both international and domestic automakers. 
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2. Literature Review and Theory Development 
Porter (1990) concluded that due to various national characteristics, nations 
cannot succeed in all industries, and thus it is important to identify and develop their 
internationally competitive industries. Therefore, he proposed the diamond model 
with four major (and two additional) determinants of competitive advantage in a 
particular industry. 
Many scholars have questioned not only the applicability of the diamond 
model in less-developed nations, but also the measurements Porter used for 
international competitiveness and the power of government on industry 
competitiveness. This section briefly discusses the prior research related to Porter’s 
diamond model and outlines a focused theoretical framework for the current study. 
2.1. Porter’s Diamond Model on Competitiveness 
According to Porter (1990) nations are most likely to succeed in industries or 
industry segments where the diamond factors are mostly favorable. The six major 
competitiveness determinants are summarized below and their theoretical relationship 
is shown in Figure 1. 
Factor conditions for production are the inputs and infrastructure necessary for 
competition, which include: 
• Human resources: quality and quantity of skilled labor, cost of personnel, and 
labor skill variety; 
• Physical resources: “the abundance, quality, accessibility, and cost of the 
nation’s land, water, mineral, or timber deposits, hydroelectric power sources, 
fishing grounds, and other physical traits.” (Porter, 1990, p. 74); 
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• Knowledge resources: market, scientific, technical knowledge residing in a 
nation’s research institutions; 
• Capital resources: capital availability and cost to finance industries. Capital 
resources can be affected by the rate of savings and national capital market 
structure; 
• Infrastructure: availability and quality of infrastructure, including 
communication system, transportation system, payment or funds transfer, 
health care, and so forth (Porter, 1990, p. 74-75). 
Demand conditions refer to home demand condition (Porter furthered his analysis to 
include international demand condition in his later work on industry development). 
Porter (1990) discussed home demand through three general attributes: the nature of 
buyer needs, the size and growth rate of home demand, and the transferability of 
domestic demand into foreign markets. As Porter described in his location 
competitiveness study, advantage arises from “having sophisticated and demanding 
local customers or customers with unusually intense need for specialized varieties 
also in demand elsewhere” (1998, p. 327). 
Related and supporting industries include parts and service suppliers and distributors 
in the supply chain. As Porter stated, competitive supplier industries can provide 
“efficient, early, rapid, and preferential access to inputs” (1990, p. 101) which are 
basic production needs. Moreover, the geographic proximity with internationally 
competitive suppliers in the home nation helps build coordination and a 
communication network, which in turn improves production efficiency. Based on the 
availability and efficiency of supporting industries, the most significant benefit of 
home-based suppliers lies in the ability to accelerate innovation and upgrade in the 
overall auto industry. 
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Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry discuss the context in which firms are created, 
managed, and operated, given the domestic demand conditions, factor conditions, and   
supporting industry situations. In a developed industry, firms would build on the 
strengths provided by the source(s) of competitive advantage and invest in improving 
the less competitive factors. Moreover, as Porter concluded, fierce domestic 
competition pressures firms to innovate and improve productivity and consequently 
increase national competitiveness in the industry. Furthermore, “vigorous local and 
global competition not only sharpens advantages at home but pressures domestic 
firms to sell abroad in order to grow.” (1998, p. 119). 
Government sets up policies, rules, and regulations in industry activities. It is directly 
responsible for improving the wellbeing of citizens, as well as achieving economic 
and political stability (social benefits) (Porter, 1998). Government can influence all 
the four general determinants either positively or negatively. As Porter (1990) pointed 
out, government can affect factor conditions by imposing subsidiary policies, capital 
market regulations, and educational policies. It can also influence domestic demand 
conditions by establishing product standards or regulations that direct customer needs. 
Competition laws, tax policy, and other regulatory statutes can affect both supporting 
industries and firm structure and strategy. 
One example of government policy is the economic form. Studies support that 
market-controlled economies are more efficient in improving productivity and 
innovation than those under government protection (Agarwal & Wu, 2004; Blumental, 
1999; Koehn, 2002). Meanwhile, government encouragement of joint ventures (JV) 
with global competitive firms will facilitate technology transfer (Ali, Na, Law, & 
Buszard, 2004). 
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Chance refers to external events that may affect or benefit a nation or industry and 
that are totally outside the control of firms and government. Examples of chance 
events include pure invention, breakthroughs in basic technologies, wars, economic 
crisis, and major shifts in foreign market demand. They create discontinuities that can 
unfreeze or reshape industry structure and thus play an important role in shifting 
competitive advantage in many industries. Firms evaluate chance events differently 
due to various industry natures and stages in their lifecycle. Porter (1990) proposed 
that firms promote continuous innovation and improvement, and endeavor to seize 
opportunity resulting from chance events. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Porter's diamond model (Porter, 1990, p. 76) 
 
The determinants, individually and as a system, create the context in 
which a nation’s firms are born and compete: the availability of 
resources and skills necessary for competitive advantage in an industry; 
the information that shapes what opportunities are perceived and the 
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directions in which resources and skills are deployed; the goal of the 
owners, managers, and employees that are involved in or carry out 
competition; and most importantly, the pressure on firms to invest and 
innovate. (Porter, 1990, p. 71) 
 
Porter also defined and discussed the clusters of industries formed by 
networks among companies, suppliers, service providers, supporting industries, and 
associations (i.e. universities or trade associations). These clusters of industries could 
build strong capacities that contribute to the overall industry competitiveness (Porter, 
1998). For example, Bell (2005) found that firms inside a cluster innovate at a greater 
level than the ones outside because better communication and more efficient supply 
chain management enhance the learning and knowledge creation processes.  
And finally, Porter (1990) discussed the impact of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) on developing nations’ 
competitiveness. Only in the early stages of economic development, as predicted by 
Porter, would MNEs contribute to the prosperity of the host nation because MNE 
activities bring in some technology needed for their production, as well as providing 
employment opportunities and stimulating basic infrastructure development. As 
nations develop their own infrastructures and most importantly their research and 
development (R&D) capabilities, it is the internationally competitive indigenous 
industries that ultimately create and improve the nation’s competitive advantage 
around the globe. 
2.2. Prior Applications or Modifications of Porter’s Diamond Model 
Porter’s diamond model is recognized as a bridge between strategic 
management and international economics (Grant, 1991). He analyzed industry 
competitiveness through the major determinants and the contribution of particular 
industries to national competitiveness. Some scholars have applied and/or modified 
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this diamond model to analyze either industry or national competitiveness in the past 
decade. Meanwhile, others have critiqued Porter on his discussion about international 
competitiveness measures, the role of MNEs and the role of government. In this study, 
the author focuses on addressing the importance of government power as well as the 
contribution of MNEs in China’s automobile industry.  
2.2.1. Applications and/or Modifications of the Model at the National Level 
Many studies have analyzed national competitiveness using the original or 
modified diamond model. Since Porter’s model includes primarily national factors 
and since globalization results in a growing extent of regional (and even global) 
integration, Dunning (1993) proposed to consider international factors when 
analyzing industry or national competitiveness. Following this trend, Rugman and 
D’Cruz (1993) developed a double-diamond model where one angle of a national 
diamond is dependent on another nation’s diamond (i.e. Mexico has relatively low 
domestic demand but the nation improves its competitiveness through linking to 
strong U.S. demand and thus strengthening its export market (Hodgetts, 1993)). 
Cartwright’s (1993) study on New Zealand developed a multi-linked diamond for 
small, export-dependent nations where all determinants of national competitiveness 
are linked to global sourcing. 
2.2.2. Applications and/or Modifications at the Industry or Firm level 
Although the diamond model was originally developed for national 
competitive analysis, Porter also provided industry case analyses in his sample nations, 
in order to show that the model can be approached at the industry level. Other 
scholars thus have used this model to analyze specific industry competitiveness. For 
example, a recent study by Barragan (2005) tested the power of the double-diamond 
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model in Mexico’s automobile industry.  Barclay and Gray (2001) provided a case 
study of the information service industry in Barbados. Moon and Lee (2004) looked at 
the competitive performance of two MNEs using the diamond model and proposed an 
enlarged diamond through FDI integration in all determinants. The current study 
applies Porter’s model to analyze China’s auto industry competitiveness.  
2.3. Comments on Porter’s Diamond 
• The impact of MNEs 
Porter’s model has been criticized regarding its purported claim on the impact 
of globalization and FDI on the host nation’s diamond (Bellak & Weiss, 1993; 
Cartwright, 1993; Dunning, 1980; Grant, 1991; Hodgetts, 1993; O’Malley & 
O’Gorman, 2001; Oz, 2002; Rugman & D’Cruz, 1993; Rugman & Verbeke, 1993a; 
Sledge, 2005). Porter (1998) concluded that since MNEs invest in a host nation 
mostly for the purpose of resource or market access, they can help strengthen host 
nation’s competitiveness only in the early stages of economic development, while the 
ultimate source of competitiveness or financial viability comes from the development 
of indigenous competitive firms.  
However, Dunning’s (1980) study showed that when large MNEs seek to 
improve their global competence and efficiency (when a home nation does not have 
all sources of competitive advantage), their activities in some or all of the 
determinants do contribute to a host nation’s competitiveness in the long run. Young, 
Hood, and Peters (1994) offered an example of the contribution of MNEs in a host 
nation’s diamond. They pointed out that global sourcing attracts MNEs to fully 
develop parts of their supply chain in host nations that could become global suppliers 
to the international market. O’Malley and O’Gorman’s (2001) study of the Irish 
software industry also supported the idea that the presence of MNEs helps nurture 
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indigenous industries, especially in the related and supporting sectors. Thus, Rugman 
and Verbeke (1993a) proposed that FDI in small and/or developing nations should be 
included when analyzing national or industry competitiveness.  
• Measurements for international competitiveness 
Scholars have also commented on Porter’s measurements for competitiveness 
(Cartwright, 1993; Grant, 1993; Hodgetts, 1993; Rugman & Verbeke, 1993b). Porter 
(1990) selected sixteen industry clusters and tested the model across eight advanced 
countries. He used productivity and export-related measurements to analyze nations’ 
global competitive positions. Regarding small or emerging economies, Bellak and 
Weiss (1993) suggested applying multi-measurements (besides Porter’s) for both 
national and international trade progressions, such as total export from auto-related 
industries and the contribution of the domestic auto industry to national GDP. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, inward-FDI related measures, such as the percentages 
of production and sales revenue from foreign-funded firms, should also be included 
when analyzing industry competitiveness in emerging nations. 
• Significance of government power 
As O’Shaughnessy (1996) stated, the diamond model simplified the impact of 
culture, history, and policies on economic development. Looking at China, previous 
studies have discussed the impact of centrally-planned economies (Oughton, 1997), 
the danger of government protectionism (Qin, 2004), and the ongoing economic and 
policy reform after its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession (Agarwal & Wu, 
2004; Ali, et al., 2004; Blumental, 1999; Breslin, 2004; Sit & Liu, 2000; Zhang, 2003; 
Zhu & Nyland, 2005). Following the pace of globalization, the interaction between 
the Chinese government and MNEs would have a significant influence on China’s 
global competitiveness. 
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In sum, this study applies Porter’s diamond model to analyze China’s auto 
industry competitiveness. To adjust the diamond model based on the major comments 
discussed above, the author retrieved archival data to analyze industry 
competitiveness using multiple measurements from both Porter and others’ studies; 
the author also incorporated a published case study of one auto assembler to discover 
the strategic performance of auto joint ventures in China and the impact of 
government power; and finally the author conducted telephone interviews to 
triangulate my findings.  
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3. Research Questions 
In the 1950s, major industries were under the direct control of the government, 
with centrally planned resource allocation and production. However, limited resources 
and little experience in economic development constrained the nation’s ability to meet 
growing domestic demand. The Chinese government thus faced the dilemma of 
excessive domestic demand and low production capacity, especially in high-
technology industries. Many high-tech products were highly dependent on imports, 
which created a huge trade deficit within international business (Harwit, 1995).  To 
meet local demand as well as to improve trade balance, the Chinese government 
introduced several policy reforms in an effort to stimulate domestic production and 
attract inward FDI in export-oriented industries (Breslin, 2004; Han & Kim, 2003).  
The open-door policy and economic reform introduced in the late ‘70s reduced 
government protection (Wang, 1999). Different forms of FDI (equity JVs, co-
operative JVs, or wholly-owned ventures) were allowed in several industries, such as 
textiles and manufacturing. However, to maintain central control of the overall 
economy, government retained high protectionism in the pillar industries, which 
include semiconductor, automobile, and telecommunication sectors (Zhu & Nyland, 
2005). This economic reform successfully stimulated domestic production and 
brought in FDI, while problems still existed. Firstly, the greater the government 
protection, the more dependent were those pillar industries on preferential policy 
and/or subsidies, and the less internationally competitive they were. Secondly, the 
nation’s low infrastructure quality could not meet global standards and thus these 
industries were still limited in their ability to improve production efficiency (Ali et al., 
2004; Oughton, 1997).  
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Since MNEs were eager to get access into China’s potential market and the 
government recognized that FDI is necessary in all sectors in the early stages of 
economic development, China introduced the 1994 industrial policy in an effort to 
attract FDI in those pillar industries and more importantly to encourage knowledge 
transfer through the promotion of equity JVs and rigid localization requirements. This 
industrial policy was a milestone in the history of China’s automobile sector 
development since it helped build up China’s three giant automakers (First Auto 
Work (FAW), Dongfeng, and SAIC) and gave indigenous parts suppliers the 
opportunity to work closely with leading global auto assemblers and parts suppliers 
(Wang, 1999).  
China has demonstrated a growing ambition in securing export market: in fact, 
to lubricate multilateral trade, China entered the WTO in 2001, which required the 
permission of FDI in most industries and the removal of trade barriers and protective 
policies. Now, nearly five years after its WTO accession, China has made significant 
progression in economic development and policy reform. However, foreign business 
practitioners still see hidden trade barriers (i.e. government’s remaining protective 
power) that limit their ability to control and further explore efficiency in China (Wang, 
1999; Zhang, 2003; Zhu & Nyland, 2005).  
In sum, government plays an important role in China’s auto industry 
development; as well, MNEs, together with their Chinese auto partners, contribute 
significantly to the prosperity of the industry. Therefore, this study incorporates 
Porter’s diamond model and tries to identify and analyze: 
• The overall competitiveness of the Chinese auto industry,  
• The role of government in stimulating industry competitiveness, and  
• Domestic automakers and their joint venture performance. 
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4. Research Settings—China Automobile and Porter’s Diamond 
Porter’s diamond model provides an analytical framework with multi-
measurements for national or industry competitiveness. Many scholars have assessed 
Porter’s model in developed nations and some emerging economies; however, none of 
them look at China specifically through Porter’s dimensions in regard to industry 
competitiveness. The current study will provide insights into the competitive position 
of China’s auto industry through Porter’s single diamond model. Further, China is in 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy. Fast economic 
growth is accompanied by serious problems in industry structure (Harwit, 1995). Thus, 
both political and economic reforms are necessary to meet global standard and 
stimulate international trade. By looking at the government’s impact in the auto 
industry, this study will address one major facet on Porter’s diamond model—the 
significance of government power on emerging nations’ competitiveness. Finally, this 
study also hopes to provide a practical understanding of the model as a tool for 
policymakers, business practitioners, and research academics to increase industry 
competitiveness.   
China’s auto industry is representative of the overall national economic 
development, because as one of China’s pillar industries it generates attentions from 
various stakeholders, including domestic and international auto firms, national and 
local governments, and component and parts suppliers. Thus studying this sector can 
help boost understanding of other major industries. Understanding the overall industry 
competitiveness can assist both business practitioners and policymakers in future 
strategic decisions. 
Finally, at the firm level, domestic firms accustomed to government protection 
must learn to face international competition independently, while MNEs still find it 
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difficult to do business in China due to hidden barriers and government power. By 
looking at the performance of major automobile manufacturers in China, this study 
will further assess the reaction of domestic auto firms to government policies and the 
contributions of MNEs to an emerging nation’s industry competitiveness. 
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5. Research Methodology 
In the diamond model, factor and demand conditions are mostly general facts. 
In contrast, firm performance of both assemblers and suppliers and their reaction to 
government policy changes contribute the most to the industry prosperity in China, 
which are more specific and analyzable for the current study. Thus, this study focuses 
on analyzing related and supporting industries, firm structure and strategy, and the 
role of government.   
This study analyzed the general competitiveness of the Chinese automotive 
industry, following measurements from Porter and other scholars (see Appendix A). 
To address the significance of foreign investment, the author included FDI 
distribution in major industries, auto joint ventures performances, and multinational 
and domestic auto firms strategy differences. The author also discussed changes in 
China’s auto industry policies in an effort to understand the government’s role in 
stimulating industry competitiveness. In Porter’s original study, “chance” is used to 
include all uncontrollable events, such as natural disasters or wars. Since China’s auto 
industry develops in a stable process with few chance events, the author replaced the 
“chance” with China’s WTO membership and focused on analyzing policy changes 
and their impact on automotive industry competitiveness.  
To address the third research question, one case study of SAIC and its JVs 
with Volkswagen (VW) and General Motors (GM) was incorporated from prior 
studies (see Appendix B for a complete list of qualitative research documents) in an 
effort to discover the strategic performance of and power balance between MNEs and 
domestic automakers. The case study method is useful when it is important to study a 
phenomenon in context where there are many variables to explore (Yin, 2003).  
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The time period selected is from the early 1990s until after China’s WTO 
accession (as a consecutive timeline). Before WTO accession, China adopted an 
industrial policy in the auto sector in 1994. The transition and reform after its WTO 
accession has been ongoing since 2001. Thus, this study tries to compare and analyze 
China’s auto industry policy changes and their impact on firm strategy and 
performance. 
5.1. General Competitiveness Analysis 
Porter’s indicators for international competitiveness are mostly export-related 
measures, such as “increase in exports to the world” and “proportion of exports from 
the industry with respect to the total export of the nation” (Porter, 1990, p. 742). Due 
to the unique characteristics of China (with large potential demand and supply 
markets but little international trade in the auto industry at its current economic stage), 
this study adopts measurements from both Porter and other scholars to analyze 
China’s auto market competitiveness (detailed measurements and methods of analysis 
are summarized in Appendix A). 
The author retrieved mostly archival data from the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS China), industrial association reports, WTO documents, trade journals, 
company reports, and academic journals, in order to discover any improvement or 
retrogression in the auto sector. The author analyzed the competitiveness of major 
determinants from consecutive trends in definite data (i.e. production capacity) and 
changes in descriptive measures (i.e. policy adaptation), according to prior studies’ 
methods and Porter’s comments. To ensure consistency in the findings, the author 
incorporated production- or trade-related hard data from national or international 
statistics reports, and built analysis on case facts provided in previous studies. 
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5.2. Case Study of SAIC 
To further address the government impact and auto firm performance, the 
author retrieved multi-source case facts to analyze the history and future prospect of 
one domestic auto firm, and its interaction with MNEs. Reviewed studies are grouped 
into five categories: academic research, company report, government report, industrial 
association, and trade journal. All important findings and data were archived in a 
database for future access and reference. 
SAIC-VW is the first auto JV in China and has been the leader in this area for 
the past two decades. Since SAIC has experienced both development and difficulties 
along with China’s economic reform (Depner & Bathelt, 2005), studying its 
experience may offer valuable insights on the overall market progression in China. 
Moreover, following Chinese policy promotion, SAIC’s another joint venture partner 
General Motors, shows increasing growth potential in the Chinese market. Comparing 
Shanghai VW and Shanghai GM’s strategies and performances in China could 
provide significant implications to both indigenous and global auto firms. 
Similar to the archival data analysis for general competitiveness, this case 
study focuses on discussing several sources of competitiveness that are related 
specifically to SAIC operation, which include related and supporting industries, firm 
structure strategy and rivalries, and the impact of government power.  
5.3. Interview Data 
The author conducted interviews with personnel in auto-related industries in 
order to check the accuracy of archival data analysis and gain current insights from 
experts in different fields. Prior studies have showed that approximately five to seven 
interviews are sufficient for supplementary and confirmative purposes (Barragan, 
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2005; McCracken, 1988). Target interviewees included policymakers, research 
academics, and personnel from auto joint ventures, parts suppliers, and distributors.  
The author identified potential interviewees from research institution contact 
lists, company websites, and industrial organization yellow pages. The interview 
guide (provided in Appendix D) covered both general and specific questions 
according to the expertise of the specific interviewee. The author contacted the target 
interviewees by telephone and read the invitation letter and the consent form to them 
directly. Appendix C shows the written invitation letter and consent form. 
The invitation letter and interview guide were written in English, and then 
translated into Chinese. An external translator conducted backward translation to 
ensure information accuracy. The author conducted the telephone interviews in 
Chinese and took notes of the answers. All interview notes were then translated into 
English, transcribed into Word document and analyzed according to the following 
topics: 1) strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, (with respect to Porter’s 
competitiveness determinants) in China’s auto industry; 2) government impact on 
auto industry development; 3) performance of auto joint venture partners; 4) 
performance of indigenous and foreign parts suppliers; and 5) the impact of China’s 
WTO membership on the auto industry development. 
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6. Results 
6.1. General Competitiveness of China and its Automobile Industry 
The auto industry in China has experienced 53 years of development since the 
foundation of the First Auto Manufacture Group Corporation (now First Auto Work), 
and scholars have divided those years into four major developmental stages (Francois 
& Spinanger, 2004; Harwit, 1995; Jing, 2005): 
1. 1953-65: the nation learned technological skills mainly from the Soviet Union 
and followed strictly planned production. There was no international contact at 
all and annual production was on average 60,000 units.  
2. 1966-80: production capacity increased significantly (to 160,000 units per year) 
due to fast growing domestic demand. By 1980, China had 56 plant sites, 192 
factories for various sorts of vehicles, and 2,000 spare parts producers (China 
Automotive Yearbook, 1986). Such proliferation of auto plants was in 
response to Maoist’ “self-reliance policy” and based on a positive estimated 
profit in auto market. “The government advocated strict limits on imports of 
trucks and cars, hoping that modernization of existing factories and attention 
to manufacturing small passenger cars and light trucks could satisfy projected 
national needs for such vehicles.” (Harwit, 1995, p. 143). 
3. 1981-98: by the mid-80s, the Chinese government found out that growing auto 
demand could not be satisfied by extant domestic manufacturers, even with 
high government subsidies and preferential policies. Thus, joint venture 
became China’s choice of preference in order to use foreign investors’ 
advanced technologies, capitals, and managerial skills to develop domestic 
manufacturing and meet local needs. Deng Xiaoping’s “Open Door Policy” 
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introduced in 1978 attracted large amount of FDI into China, and Volkswagen 
became the first foreign entrant into China’s auto assembly industry. In those 
years the number of auto production companies had increased to 2,500, of 
which 60% were joint ventures. Based on a positive estimation of profit from 
auto industry, many provincial governments promoted regionalized production, 
which fragmented the auto assembly and part supplying markets. 
4. 1999-present: market rationalization and WTO accession attracted more FDI 
from leading global auto firms. Production capacity had reached around 3 
million in 2002, a large amount of which concentrated in east coastal areas. 
 
 China’s first wave of investment began in 1984 and included the 
establishment of Beijing Jeep and Shanghai Volkswagen. The second wave came in 
the early 1990s, when FAW-Volkswagen, Guangzhou Peugeot, and Dongfeng-
Citroën came into being. Total investment in the industry, including foreign capital 
inflow, climbed from $64 million US in the sixth Five-Year Plan period (1981-1985) 
to $0.87 billion US in the eighth (1991-1995) period. The third wave dated to the late 
1990s, when GM, Toyota Motor, and Ford secured their respective car assembly deals 
at Shanghai GM, Tianjin Toyota Motor, and Chang’an-Ford. In the ninth and tenth 
Five-Year Plans (1996-2005), cumulative investment in the auto sector amounts to 
$23.5 billion US from 1996 to 2004, which is 0.71% of total national investment 
(China Automotive Yearbook, 2004; NBS, 2004). Besides a growing number of 
multinational auto firms entering the market, the fourth wave of investment (since 
2001) has also been characterized by the emergence of new Chinese car assemblers 
such as the Geely Group, Brilliance China, and Shanghai Chery (Xing, 2002). 
 22
Since the last round of investment, it appears that the Chinese auto market is 
becoming the front line of global competition for international auto giants. Meanwhile, 
multinationals will also have to contend with local players that are launching new 
models and competing for supply network, and who are competitive in terms of both 
cost and versatility. Tables 1 and 2 show major car producers in China and their 
geographical locations. By the end of 2003, China’s auto production capacity 
approached 3 million units and is expected to reach 7 million in 2006 (Jing, 2005).  
Table 1 Production capacity in provinces, 2003 
Province Capacity(units/year) 
Shanghai 810,000 
Jilin 340,000 
Liaoning 230,000 
Sichuan 205,000 
Hubei 180,000 
Guangxi Zhuang 150,000 
Zhejiang 150,000 
Beijing 145,000 
Jiangsu 130,000 
Guangdong 120,000 
Tianjin 120,000 
Shandong 100,000 
Fujian 80,000 
Anhui 60,000 
Hainan 50,000 
Shanxi 50,000 
Heilongjiang 30,000 
Henan 30,000 
Guizhou 10,000 
Total 2,990,000 
Note. China Automotive Yearbook, 2004. 
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Table 2 Major car producers and capacities in China, 2003 
Producer Foreign Partner Capacity (units/year) 
Beijing Hyundai Hyundai 30,000
Beijing Jeep Daimler-Chrysler 85,000
Chang'an Ford Ford 50,000
Chang'an Suzuki Suzuki 150,000
Dongfeng Honda Honda 60,000
Dongfeng PSA PSA/Citroen 150,000
Dongfeng Yueda Kia Kia 50,000
Dongfeng Yulong Nissan 60,000
FAW Chengdu Toyota 5,000
FAW-Hainan Mazda 50,000
FAW-Toyota Toyota/Mazda 100,000
FAW-VW Volkswagen 270,000
Geely - 150,000
Guizhou Aviation Ind. Subaru (Fuji Heavy Ind.) 50,000
Harbin Hafei Mitsubishi 30,000
Hunan Changfeng Mitsubishi 30,000
Jiangsu Nanya Fiat 100,000
Jiangxi Fuqi - 20,000
Jiangxi Suzuki Suzuki 30,000
Jinbei Brilliant BMW 200,000
Jinbei General Motors General Motors 30,000
Rongcheng Huatai Hyundai 20,000
SAIC Chery Daewoo 60,000
SAIC-GM General Motors 150,000
SAIC-GM Wuling General Motors 150,000
SAIC-VW Volkswagen 450,000
Sanjiang Renault Renault 30,000
Shangdong Yantai General Motors 50,000
Shanghai JMStar - 30,000
Southeast - 60,000
Tianjin-Daihatsu Daihatsu 150,000
Tianjing-Xiali - 20,000
Xi'an Qinchuan - 30,000
Yuejin Auto - 30,000
Yuejin Auto Fiat 30,000
Zhengzhou Nissan Nissan 30,000
Total  2,990,000
Note. Adapted from Francois & Spinanger, 2004, p. 18.  
 
It was only in 1993 that China began to emerge as a global trading power. 
After 1993, exports increased by 60% in two years and doubled in five years. In the 
process, a $12.2 billion US trade deficit in 1993 was transformed into a $5.4 billion 
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US surplus in the following year, with the trade surplus rising to $40.3 billion US in 
1997. 1993 also marked the emergence of China as a major recipient of FDI—indeed 
more FDI flowed into China in 1993 than in the entire preceding fourteen years of 
reform combined (Breslin, 2004; NBS, 1994).  
In 2004, China ranked the third leading international trader, with 6.5% share 
of world export and 5.9% of world imports (WTO, 2005). However, China’s export 
market is still dominated by miscellaneous manufacturing and information technology 
and electronic component products. As shown in Table 3, China’s top 30 export 
industries accounted for more than 60% of total export value, among which motor 
vehicle and parts exports only contributed an insignificant amount (less than 2%). 
Measured against Porter’s export-related indicators for international competitiveness, 
China’s auto industry, with low whole-vehicle and parts exports, is still at its early 
stage of development and does not contribute much to the nation’s competitive power. 
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Table 3 China's top 30 export industries, 2004 
Product Label Export (US billions) 
Import (US 
billions) 
Balance 
Trade 
Share of Total 
National 
Exports (%) 
COMPUTER EQUIPMENT  59.91 14.46 45.45 10.10 
TELECOMMS EQUIPMENT NES  44.12 23.18 20.94 7.44 
OFFICE EQUIP. PARTS/ACCS. 24.88 14.92 9.96 4.19 
ARTICLES OF APPAREL NES  18.20 0.52 17.68 3.07 
BABY CARR/TOY/GAME/SPORT 16.36 0.50 15.86 2.76 
VALVES/TRANSISTORS/ETC  16.18 74.45 -58.27 2.73 
SOUND/TV RECORDERS ETC  15.86 1.21 14.65 2.67 
FOOTWEAR  15.20 0.48 14.73 2.56 
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT NES 13.58 12.27 1.31 2.29 
WOMEN/GIRL CLOTHING WVEN 12.83 0.32 12.52 2.16 
FURNITURE/STUFF FURNISHG 12.62 0.67 11.95 2.13 
DOMESTIC EQUIPMENT  10.18 0.45 9.73 1.72 
MENS/BOYS WEAR, WOVEN  10.06 0.27 9.79 1.70 
ARTICLES NES OF PLASTICS 9.18 2.12 7.06 1.55 
ELECTRIC CIRCUIT EQUIPMT 8.18 14.93 -6.75 1.38 
MADE-UP TEXTILE ARTICLES 7.74 0.08 7.66 1.30 
BASE METAL MANUFAC NES  7.57 2.38 5.19 1.28 
OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS NES  7.12 23.44 -16.32 1.20 
HEADGEAR/NON-TEXT CLOTHG 7.07 0.12 6.96 1.19 
MAN-MADE WOVEN FABRICS  7.03 3.28 3.75 1.19 
ELECT POWER TRANSM EQUIP 6.99 4.48 2.51 1.18 
WOMEN/GIRL WEAR KNIT/CRO 6.66 0.07 6.59 1.12 
TRUNKS AND CASES  6.30 0.11 6.19 1.06 
COTTON FABRICS, WOVEN  6.04 2.25 3.79 1.02 
TRAILERS/CARAVANS/ETC  5.97 0.07 5.90 1.01 
MISC MANUF ARTICLES NES  5.77 0.96 4.82 0.97 
INDUST HEAT/COOL EQUIPMT 5.67 4.82 0.85 0.96 
TELEVISION RECEIVERS  5.49 0.15 5.34 0.92 
MOTORCYCLES/CYCLES/ETC  5.17 0.22 4.95 0.87 
MOTOR VEH PARTS/ACCESS  4.43 7.34 -2.91 0.75 
     
Subtotal Exports 382.395   64.45 
Total Export 593.325   100.00 
Note. Summarized from United Nation Statistics Division, 2005, Table 156. 
 
As seen in Table 4 and 5, China had made significant progressions in 
exporting and importing automotive products and it maintained a relatively high 
annual growth rate (average 48% and 45% increase in export and import respectively, 
from 2000 to 2004); however, China’s share of world auto exports and imports are 
still lower than other leading nations, and auto product exports account for a low 
percentage in national total exports. 
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Table 4 Export and import of automotive products of selected economies 
Value (US billions) 
Share in 
Economy's 
Exports (%) 
 
1990 2000 2002 2003 2004 2000 2004 
Export 
China 0.26 1.58 2.68 3.57 6.27 0.6 1.1
United States 32.55 67.19 67.09 69.24 76.42 8.6 9.3
Canada 28.44 60.66 56.33 56.95 63.66 21.9 20.1
Japan 66.19 88.08 92.51 102.73 115.73 18.4 20.5
Mexico 4.71 30.65 30.91 30.13 31.56 18.4 16.7
European Union - 287.19 330.40 403.64 470.79 11.8 12.7
Intra-EU - 215.55 242.90 297.38 344.90 13.1 13.7
Extra-EU - 71.64 87.50 106.26 125.89 9.0 10.5
Republic of Korea 2.30 15.19 17.33 23.12 32.32 8.8 12.7
Import 
China 1.80 3.80 6.96 12.78 14.43 1.7 2.6
United States 79.32 170.19 176.63 181.28 197.00 13.5 12.9
Canada 24.64 46.28 46.63 49.10 52.85 19.3 19.3
Japan 7.33 9.96 9.89 11.13 12.80 2.6 2.8
Mexico 5.27 20.00 21.26 20.19 21.60 11.5 10.9
European Union - 246.75 277.51 344.23 397.44 9.6 10.5
Extra-EU - 32.14 34.35 43.66 52.54 3.5 4.1
Republic of Korea 0.93 1.77 2.54 3.04 3.46 1.1 1.5
Note. Adapted from WTO, 2005, Section 4, Table 67. 
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Table 5 Share of world automotive products exports and imports 
Value 
(US 
billions)
Share in World 
Exports or Imports 
(%) 
Annual Percentage Change 
 2004 1990 2000 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Export 
European Union 470.79 - 49.9 55.6 13 12 22 17
   Extra-EU 125.89 - 12.4 14.9 15 16 21 18
Japan 115.73 20.8 15.3 13.7 7 15 11 13
United States 76.42 10.2 11.7 9.0 3 6 3 10
Canada 63.66 8.9 10.5 7.5 1 2 1 12
Republic of Korea 32.32 0.7 2.6 3.8 21 12 33 40
Mexico 31.56 1.5 5.3 3.7 1 1 -3 5
Brazil 8.68 0.6 0.8 1.0 17 2 33 33
Turkey 8.10 0.0 0.3 1.0 51 39 57 59
China 6.27 0.1 0.3 0.7 41 42 33 76
Thailand 5.71 0.0 0.4 0.7 27 12 33 44
Taipei, Chinese 3.74 0.3 0.4 0.4 14 15 22 23
South Africa 3.70 0.1 0.3 0.4 21 62 29 19
Australia 3.09 0.2 0.4 0.4 10 3 18 12
Russian Federation 2.21 - 0.2 0.3 26 18 26 44
Argentina 2.19 0.1 0.4 0.3 1 -19 -9 44
Above 15 834.18 - 98.7 98.5 - - - -
Import 
European Union 397.44 - 41.9 46.2 13 11 24 15
   Extra-EU 52.54 - 5.5 6.1 13 10 27 20
United States 197.00 24.7 28.9 22.9 4 7 3 9
Canada 52.85 7.7 7.9 6.1 3 11 5 8
Mexico 21.60 1.6 3.4 2.5 2 9 -5 7
China 14.43 0.6 0.6 1.7 40 42 84 13
Australia 13.35 1.2 1.5 1.6 12 18 30 20
Japan 12.80 2.3 1.7 1.5 6 7 13 15
Turkey 11.51 0.4 1.0 1.3 19 31 122 85
Russian Federation 10.50 - 0.4 1.2 43 19 45 54
Switzerland 8.10 1.9 1.1 0.9 7 -1 12 12
Saudi Arabia 6.72 0.9 0.6 0.8 15 5 11 11
South Africa 5.65 ... 0.4 0.7 24 -10 47 54
United Arab 
Emirates 5.64 0.3 0.5 0.8 ... 20 45 ...
Norway 4.58 0.4 0.4 0.5 15 13 18 32
Thailand 3.87 0.8 0.4 0.4 19 15 33 16
Above 15 766.03 - 90.7 89.2 - - - -
Note. Summarized from WTO, 2005, Section 4, Table 66. 
 
Despite its low export share in the global auto industry, China’s competitive 
position has improved significantly in the past a few years. The total annual 
production ranking has risen from the ninth in 1999 to the fourth in 2003. China’s 
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auto production as a percentage of world total production has risen from 3.28% in 
1999 to 7.85% in 2004 (as shown in Table 6, China Automotive Yearbook, 2004). 
Nonetheless, although China is showing an increasing production capacity and a large 
potential for auto exports, growing auto production in recent years are mainly serving 
domestic demand, which indicates low international competitiveness.  
Table 6 China and world annual auto productions (million units) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
A: China 1.83 2.07 2.34 3.25 4.44 5.07
B: World 55.88 58.30 56.16 58.78 60.66 64.62
A/B (%) 3.28 3.55 4.17 5.54 7.33 7.85
China rank in the world 9 8 8 5 4 4
Note. China Automotive Yearbook, 2004 
 
In 2002, China manufactured 3,254,200 vehicles and sold 3,248,000 units, an 
annual increase of 38.49% and 36.65% respectively. The three leading auto firms 
together produced 1,571,900 vehicles and sold 1,591,300 units, accounting for 
approximately half national productions and sales. Vehicle exports and imports data 
was also significant after the year of China’s WTO accession. In 2002, Vehicle import 
reached 127,000 units, a 76.9% increase from 2001. Passenger cars import increased 
by 50.8%, sport utility vehicles (SUVs) by 211.3% and light trucks by 160.8%. 
Vehicle export increased to 43,000 units, a 75.9% increase from the previous year. 
Although parts and component export increased to $2.38 billion US, import also 
amounted to $3.39 billion US (China Automotive Yearbook, 2003). By 2008, the 
market is forecast to reach a value of $63.81 billion US, which equates to a compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR)  of 21.7% in the 2003-2008 period, much stronger than 
that of the Asia-Pacific market (Lienert, 2003). 
China’s auto industry value has been growing at an average rate of 3.3 folds as 
Gross Domestic Products (GDP) growth from 1999 to 2004 (see Table 7), which 
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becomes a leading force in the national economy. By 2010, as predicted by economic 
experts, added value from automobile and related industries will have reached $150-
250 billion US which will promote GDP increase by 1~1.8% (Jing, 2005; Lienert, 
2003). Tax revenue from the automobile industry will contribute to more than 30% of 
that from total mechanical industries (NBS, 2005). 
Table 7 Auto industry growth rate and its contribution to GDP 
Year 
A: GDP 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
B: Auto Market 
Value Growth 
Rate (%) 
B/A 
C: GDP 
(US 
billions) 
D: Auto 
market value 
(US billions) 
D/C 
1998 5.21 5.37 1.03 114.55 2.58 2.25
1999 4.75 12.73 2.68 120.00 2.91 2.42
2000 9.02 23.11 2.56 130.81 3.58 2.74
2001 8.77 23.09 2.63 142.29 4.41 3.10
2002 5.22 44.69 8.56 153.10 6.37 4.16
2003 9.30 36.10 3.88 171.44 13.78 8.04
2004 9.50 17.49 1.84 199.60 16.10 8.07
Average 7.40 23.23 3.31 147.40 7.10 4.40
Note. China Automotive Yearbook, 2005; NBS, 2005, Table 14-19. 
 
The rapid expansion can be traced to heavy state investment and the energetic 
introduction of foreign capital (Ali et al., 2004). Figure 2 shows the auto industry 
market value in 2004, where FDI, in terms of foreign controlled enterprises and 
partnership with domestic firms, accounted for almost half of total market share. 
Attention should be focused on parts supply market. Research showed that by the end 
of 2005, part supply firms invested with foreign capital dominated China’s auto parts 
market with more than 60% market shares. Furthermore, foreign firms controlled over 
90% market shares in advanced-technology fields, such as auto electronics and engine 
production (Invest in China, 2006). Though government’s local content regulation 
succeeded in promoting the use of local materials and increasing employment 
opportunities, indigenous first-tier suppliers still found it hard to compete with global 
firms due to low R&D capability and production capacity, which are major limitations 
on China’s auto industry development.  
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Figure 2 2004 Auto market value 
Note. *H.M.T: Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Adapted from Invest in China, 2006. 
 
As shown in Table 6 and 8, although China’s annual auto productions rank in 
top ten nations, its percentage of total world production is lower than 10%. 
Furthermore, China still has low private car possession rate, as compared with other 
top ranking nations. In 2001, China’s passenger car possession rate was 1/26 of Korea, 
1/47 of U.S. and 1/55 of Japan, which indicates a large potential demand market. In 
regard to international trade, China has an insignificant trade volume and a negative 
trade balance. Auto export from China in 2001 was merely 1/47 of U.S., 1/58 of 
Korea, and 1/159 of neighbor nation Japan, which again, according to Porter’s 
competitiveness measures, shows low competitive power in the global auto market 
(China Automotive Yearbook, 2002). 
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Table 8 2001 Auto possessions in the world’s leading auto production nations 
 
World 
Production 
Ranking 
Population per 
Passenger Car 
Population per 
Vehicle 
Auto Trade 
Balance (US 
millions) 
China 8 172.5 93.4 -46
U.S. 1 2.0 2.0 -5,346
Japan 2 2.3 1.7 3,836
Germany 3 1.8 1.7 1,685
France 4 2.0 1.7 1,817
Korea 5 5.3 3.6 1,490
Spain 6 2.2 1.8 1,097
Canada 7 1.8 1.8 906
Note. China Automotive Yearbook, 2002. 
 
In sum, China’s automobile industry has made remarkable progression from 
its early developmental stages till after the WTO accession. Both auto production and 
added value contribute to national economy at an increasing rate. However, in terms 
of international trade, China’s automobile industry still contributes a limited amount 
to national, as well as global, import and export trades comparing with other leading 
auto production nations. FDI shows significant power in China’s whole-car assembly 
and parts supply industries, which is becoming a potential threat to indigenous 
suppliers as the government reduces its protective power. A low domestic vehicle 
possession rate indicates a large potential demand market for both foreign and 
indigenous automakers, which makes it more important and practical to understand 
the competitive position of Chinese auto industry. In the following section, the author 
discussed in detail China’s auto industry competitiveness through Porter’s diamond 
model and multiple measurements. 
6.2. Porter’s Diamond in China’s Auto Industry 
Faced with the prospect of stagnant global sales, the world’s biggest 
carmakers are jockeying for a share of one of the few buoyant markets (Gao, 2002). 
China’s domestic car sales, growing at more than 10% annually, accounted for 15% 
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of global growth from 2001 to 2005 (Gao, 2002). Again, these growing sales were in 
the domestic market and did not improve China’s competitiveness in the global auto 
industry. Local demand—promoted by better roads, new distribution channels, the 
deregulation of the auto market, and China’s WTO entry—is expected to increase 
dramatically as China’s economy continues to grow (Breslin, 2004).  
6.2.1. Factor Conditions 
According to Dunning (1980) and Porter (1990), MNEs invest in other nations 
mainly for three reasons: 1) resource seeking (for lower production costs), 2) market 
seeking (to get potential market share), and 3) efficiency seeking (to optimize global 
operation and production). In the early stages of China’s economic development, 
many foreign firms invested in China for cheap material and labor costs, as well as 
low worker unionization rate and environmental standards. Thus, most of China’s 
exports come out of miscellaneous manufacturing and labor-intensive industries. 
However, MNEs entered into China’s automobile industry mostly to gain access to a 
large potential demand market and avoiding trade barriers for imports.  
 The central government has increased investment in basic infrastructure 
development in order to remove the bottleneck effect caused by low infrastructure 
conditions and to increase energy productivity, transportation quality and 
communication ability. For example, the government promotes railway, highway, and 
waterway transportation projects so as to explore domestic demand for motor vehicles 
and to improve the supply chain efficiency. By the end of 2004, there were 61,015 km 
of railways in operation (11.72% increase from 1995), 1,870661 km of highways 
(61.68% increase from 1995), and 123,337 km of navigable inland waterways 
(11.55% increase from 1995) in China (NBS, 2005). A positive estimate of profit in 
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the automobile industry indirectly promotes the development of national 
infrastructure development. 
To speed up the progression, the government has also attracted FDI in the 
basic infrastructure sectors. As we can see in Table 9, total FDI from 1997 to 2004 
reached $459.52 billion US, a large amount of which helped develop basic 
infrastructure in the nation.  
Table 9 FDI (US billions) distribution in basic industries 
Sector 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
National Total 45.26 45.46 40.32 62.38 69.19 82.77 53.50 60.63
Manufacturing 28.12 25.58 22.60 44.25 48.85 59.27 36.94 43.02
Real Estate Mgt. 5.17 6.41 5.59 5.23 5.03 7.22 5.24 5.95
Power, Gas & Water 
Supply 2.07 3.10 3.70 1.23 2.13 1.47 1.30 1.14
Social Services 1.99 2.96 2.55 4.25 4.29 4.99 3.16 3.82
Transportation, 
Storage, Postal and 
Telecommunications 
1.66 1.65 1.55 1.42 0.88 1.53 0.87 1.27
Construction 1.44 2.06 0.92 0.83 1.82 1.06 0.61 0.77
Farming, Forestry, 
Animal Husbandry 
and Fishery 
0.63 0.62 0.71 1.48 1.76 1.69 1.00 1.11
Health Care, Sports 
and Social Welfare 0.20 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.26 0.13 0.57*
Education, Culture 
and Arts 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.57*
Geological 
Prospecting and 
Water Conservancy 
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.23
Other Sectors 1.54 1.15 0.97 1.50 1.43 2.11 2.25 
Note. *Author calculated due to different classification of 2004, the $0.57 
billions US covers health care, sports, education, culture, social security and 
social welfare. Summarized from NBS, 1997-2004. 
 
Skilled labor is an important basic factor for industry development (Porter, 
1990). Although China’s population on average has a low education level, the auto 
industry attracts many skilled laborers in urban areas due to its geographical 
concentration in major cities and fast technological advancement introduced by 
foreign partners. Both labor productivity and wage in the auto section increased 
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significantly between 1994 and 2004, at the rate of 11.4% and 13.5% respectively 
(China Automotive Yearbook, 2005). China’s labor cost owns comparative advantage 
as compared with developed nations, but may not be as competitive as other 
developing nations. Wages (including welfare bonus) is on average $1 to $2 US per 
hour, which is 1/10 to 1/20 of hourly wages paid in advanced nations. As 
technological and managerial skills keep transferring into China, the quality and cost 
of its labor market will show continuous competitiveness in the world.  
Another important factor indicator is technological advancement and R&D 
investment. As shown in Table 10, China’s auto industry had cumulatively invested 
$50.2 million US in R&D, taking on average 1.5% of annual sales revenue from 1998 
to 2003. Auto assemblers invested the most, with $29.1 million US accounting for 
58% of total industry R&D investment. In the Global Competitiveness Report (from 
2000 to 2003) China generally ranked high in promoting research in industries and 
collaboration with research institutions (Schwab & Porter, 2004); however, R&D 
investments of Chinese auto firms are still lower than those of leading global 
companies. According to Jing (2005), FAW invested $1.06 billion US (1.65% of its 
sales revenue) and SAIC invested $ 0.59 billion US (2.09% of its sales revenue) in 
2003, but those were only 1/65 and 1/116, respectively, of R&D investment of Ford in 
the same year. The nation owns relatively high technological skills in developing 
trucks and light trucks, while a majority of passenger cars designs are dependent on 
foreign technology. Foreign dependency is even more significant in the auto parts 
supply market. Thus, Chinese automakers and parts suppliers need to increase their 
research investment and improve their self-design capabilities in order to compete in 
the global market.  
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Table 10 Auto industry R&D investment and sales revenues (US 100 millions) 
 
A: Total 
R&D 
investment 
B: Sales 
Revenue
A/B 
(%) 
Auto 
assemblers
Auto 
refitter Engine Parts 
1998 4.6 331.7 1.39 2.1 0.46 0.11 1.39
1999 6.9 376.7 1.84 3.6 0.54 0.30 1.60
2000 8.2 430.5 1.90 4.6 0.52 0.19 1.87
2001 7.1 514.4 1.38 4.1 0.53 0.15 1.87
2002 10.4 719.2 1.45 6.8 0.97 0.28 1.68
2003 13.0 984.8 1.32 8.0 1.02 0.58 2.77
Total 50.2 3,357.2 1.50* 29.1 4.04 1.61 11.19
Note. * indicates the average value. China Automotive Yearbook, 2004. 
 
A final advanced factor condition is the stability of the nation’s capital market 
and the availability of funds. In early years (late 1980s), capital investments in the 
automobile industry were monitored by the central government. National banks 
usually held equity in auto joint ventures to oversee the operation (Depner & Bathelt, 
2005). The 1994 industrial policy required that investments of over $60 million US 
must be approved by the central government. To comply with WTO protocol, China 
reduced its controlling power in capital market and granted more freedom to local 
governments and multinational financial institutions. Overall, government has been 
working to promote capital freedom in the auto sector and to cooperate with 
rationalizing the market. 
In conclusion, China is transitioning from its basic factor competitiveness to 
an early stage of advanced factor conditions. Improved infrastructure and labor skills 
help build a platform for industrialization while technology advancement and capital 
market freedom need further development to achieve advanced competitive factors. 
6.2.2. Demand Conditions 
Although China’s auto firms have few competitive advantages comparing to 
leading global companies in terms of technological and managerial skills, China is 
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still the largest potential demand market in the world. Kister (1998) stated that, the 
world three largest auto markets are North America (two people per vehicle), Europe 
(two people per vehicle), and Asia (34 people per vehicle). Currently North American 
and European markets have almost saturated, while China has a low vehicle 
prevalence rate. Using the ratio of U.S. automobile demand vs. income (every 1% 
increase in average income will result in 2.6% increase in vehicle demand) 
(Humphrey, 2003), Jing (2005) predicted that China’s average income will increase at 
an annual rate of 6% which, by 2010 will be translated into 10 million vehicle demand, 
and by 2020 it will be 60 million. If the consumer environment for cars improves 
significantly through the reduction of excessive taxes and fees, operational restrictions, 
and red tapes in vehicle purchasing and registration, such purchasing power may 
convert into huge auto sales.  
Figure 3 shows the production composition of China’s total vehicle output. 
China's early auto production primarily focused on heavy trucks (mostly for 
construction and military uses). Accompanied by the process of urbanization, the need 
for public transportation has increased dramatically (China Association of 
Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM), 2002; China Automotive Yearbook, 2004). In 
addition, passenger and private cars represent more and more market share because of 
increased product variety and private vehicle demand. Increasing road and highway 
constructions, as well as the rapid development of tourism, further enlarges auto 
demand market.  
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Figure 3 China auto market compositions 
Note. *2004 market shares are based on estimation. Adapted from China Automotive 
Yearbook, 2004. 
 
By 2004, China’s per capita disposable income had reached $1,177 US (some 
developed regions had exceeded $5,000 US). National savings had reached $1.3 
trillion US. Increasing purchasing power significantly stimulated the automobile 
market. Moreover, reduced interest rate (from 10.25% in 1990 to 5.22% in 1998 and 
2.25% in 2004) was introduced to promote domestic expenditures. In Beijing, for 
example, new car sales in 2004 were 260,000 units, an increase of 13.7% from 2003, 
among which passenger cars accounted for 120,000 units (Li, 2005). Currently, for 
every 100 families in Beijing, 12 own private vehicles. While this number is 
insignificant compared with developed nations, it indicates a huge buyer market for 
passenger cars (CAAM, 2002).  
China has 1.6 billion people—and more than 300 million families. Currently 
the country’s per capita GDP is low by international standards, and the majority of 
Chinese families are preoccupied with issues such as housing, medical care, and 
education (Ma, 2005). Nevertheless, the absolute number of families that can afford to 
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buy a car—from three to five million—though small in percentage, is large enough to 
sustain rapid growth in the auto market. It is clear that with increased Chinese 
purchasing power, businesses need to understand China’s middle classes, which today 
are better educated, better traveled, more informed and more demanding. There were 
around 100 million people belonging to this group in 2002, with an annual income of 
$7,000 US or above, constituting the upper 15% of the Chinese population in terms of 
household income (“Building a brand.”, 2003). By 2010, it is estimated that 400 to 
500 million Chinese will be a member of the middle class, making China a bigger 
market than the United States (Brennan, 2002). Philip Murtaugh, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer of General Motors China Group, talked at the 2001 China Business 
Summit about the opportunities in the auto market posed by the emergence of China’s 
middle class. He explained that through global experience the take off point for 
automotive sales occurred when per capita income reached $4,000 US, which is the 
case in Beijing, Shanghai, and other major cities. GM’s marketing is now shifting 
from institutional buyers to increasingly sophisticated private buyers (“The middle 
class.”, 2001). Predicting a growing number of buyers in the middle to upper classes, 
many luxury and sport car brands are also heading to China either through joint 
ventures or increased imports, such as Mercedes-Benz (JV), BMW (JV), Porsche 
(import), and Land Rover (import) (Invest in China, 2006).  
A potential problem faced by many auto firms is the asymmetric distribution 
of China’s population and income. Competition in major cities (i.e. Beijing, Shanghai, 
and Shenzhen) has been accelerated in almost all market segments (including 
economic, middle priced, and luxury cars) because of population concentration and 
relatively advanced industrialization, which indirectly causes the overcapacity 
problem in coastal auto firms. Conversely, in western inland provinces with low 
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infrastructure conditions and few foreign investments, the market is left with limited 
exploration. The nation and its auto firms need to work together in exploring inland 
demand market and in improving the general living quality.  
Overall, growing domestic demand becomes a source of competitive 
advantage in China’s auto industry. The national government is working 
cooperatively to promote domestic auto expenditures. The growing middle class 
group creates more sophisticated private customers than institutional buyers. Auto 
firms are adapting their strategy to compete in all market segments and to explore 
potential demand market in inland China.  
6.2.3. Related and Supporting Industries 
Car production in China increased more than three fold between 1993 and 
2001 (CAAM, 2002). Over the same period, the supply chain underwent a major 
transformation. Multinational part suppliers began to work closely with local 
suppliers, in response to growing pressure from global auto assemblers. Meanwhile, 
Chinese domestic carmakers tried to improve their research capacity and economy of 
scale by standardizing local supply network. 
The government acknowledged in its tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-05) for the 
development of the automotive industry that China’s auto market is still highly 
fragmented (Ma, 2005). In 2000, there were 1,628 parts manufacture enterprises, 
employing 760,000 workers. The gross industrial output of the industry was $6.9 
billion US, with a profit of $335 million US. The export value of auto parts and 
components reached $490 million US, accounting for 40% of total export value of 
automotive products (China Automotive Yearbook, 2001). Though the passenger-car 
market has changed from a sellers’ to a buyers’ market over the last decade, many of 
China’s more than 100 original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs) lack the economy 
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of scale and technical capability (Zeng & Wang, 2001). These parts suppliers, which 
are barely able to meet their own economy of scale and do not refer to global supply 
chain as benchmarking, charge higher prices than imports and are unable to design 
new products that meet assemblers’ demand. Overall, it is still a market characterized 
by dispersion, disorder, and high costs.  
Over the past two decades, relationships between suppliers and assemblers in 
the West have been transformed. First, there has been a shift towards the supply of 
complete functions (corners, systems, or modules) rather than individual components 
(Sadler, 1999). Operations previously carried out by auto assemblers, such as the 
production of seats and exhaust systems, are transferred to the first-tier suppliers. 
Second, component manufacturers have taken an increasing role in the design of 
components and systems (Sadler, 1998). While the assembler provides overall 
performance specifications and information about the interface with the car, the 
supplier designs a solution using its own technology, often adapting a basic design to 
meet customers’ specific requirements. These shifts have enabled vehicle assemblers 
to transfer R&D costs to component manufacturers and to benefit from the specialized 
technological skills of these manufacturers (Humphrey, 2003). 
Following this trend, the new direct suppliers are becoming large global firms, 
which are either specialized in complex systems, or integrators of several simpler 
subsystems, as summarized in Table 11. They are expected to have a substantial 
responsibility in the design and engineering of these systems and to coordinate the 
supply chain necessary for their manufacturing and assembly.  
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Table 11 Global auto supply chain of automotive products 
 Raw Material 
Supplier 
Standardizer Component 
Specialist 
Integrator 
Focus A company that 
supplies raw 
materials to the 
OEM or their 
suppliers 
A company that 
sets the standard 
on a global basis 
for a specific 
component or 
system 
A company that 
designs and 
manufactures a 
component 
tailored to a 
platform or 
vehicle 
A company 
that designs 
and assembles 
a whole 
module or 
system for a 
car 
Market 
Presence 
Local 
Regional 
Global 
Global 
 
Global for 1st tier 
Regional or local 
for 2nd, 3rd tiers 
Global  
Critical 
Capability 
Material science 
Process 
engineering 
Research, design 
and engineering 
Assembly and 
supply chain 
management 
capabilities 
Research, design 
and process 
engineering 
Manufacturing 
capabilities in 
varied 
technologies 
Brand image 
Product design 
and 
engineering 
Assembly and 
supply chain 
management 
capabilities 
Types of 
Components 
or Systems 
Steel blanks 
Aluminum 
ingots 
Polymer pellets 
Tires 
ABS 
Electronic control 
unit 
Stampings 
Injection 
molding 
Engine 
components 
Interiors 
Doors 
chassis 
Note. Adapted from Humphrey, 2003, p. 128-130.  
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For confirmative purpose, the author contacted twenty people and finally 
conducted seven telephone interviews. Interviewees included two sales managers 
from different auto joint ventures, one representative from a parts supply firm, one 
parts import manager from the Hainan Mazda Co. Ltd, one university professor, one 
auto magazine editor, and one consultant from an auto research institution.  
The interview with the auto magazine editor in China revealed the current 
competitive position of China’s parts supply market. According to the editor, 
indigenous parts suppliers have four strengths and four weaknesses. The first and 
most obvious strength is low production costs. Secondly, available production 
facilities build a solid infrastructure for parts manufacture and technological 
upgrading. For the above two reasons, GM and VW have planned to increase parts 
purchasing from China, with the investments of $5 billion US and €1 billion Euro 
respectively, in the next two years. This explains the large export value from auto 
parts and components market. Understanding of domestic auto supply chain and 
communication becomes the third strength of indigenous parts suppliers. Many 
domestic component manufacturers have experienced China’s industrialization 
process and thus set up a solid communication network. And the final strength lies in 
the growing demands for parts supply and after-sale maintenance.  
In regard to weaknesses, the editor expressed concerns on the future of 
indigenous parts manufacturers. Firstly, although domestic factories manufacture and 
export spare parts and components, they do not learn the central technology and thus 
merely provide cheap material and labor forces, as highlighted in the example given 
by the editor. A large portion of parts exports comes out of foreign subsidiaries and 
their joint ventures, and toward their global supply chain.  
For example, GM purchases large amount of parts from China, but 
most of them come out of GM’s China operation (GM has its own 
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parts manufacture facilities in China). GM brings in parts design and 
benefits from cheap labor and material costs but its Chinese partners 
cannot get the expected technology spillover. 
 
Closely related to the technology weakness, domestic parts suppliers do not 
have the ability to manufacture a whole module or a system independently. Lack of 
technological skills prevents indigenous parts suppliers from becoming global first-
tier suppliers. The third weakness is the lack of economy of scale in the parts supply 
market. Although market rationalization and firm consolidation show significant 
results in the whole car assembly sector, the component supply market, with over 
1,000 enterprises, is still limited by low production capacity. And finally, the editor 
considered a lack of global supply chain knowledge (i.e. production cost allocation or 
accounting system) a barrier to enter into the international market.  
Another obstacle for parts export is that China’s accounting system is 
different from the global standard. For example, there was a balance 
sheet for air filtrator export. China reported low on raw material cost 
but high on administrative cost (which is true following low Chinese 
material price and the firm’s large labor cost). But the buyer firm 
finally rejected the deal because they considered low material cost as 
low production quality while high administrative cost as low efficiency. 
 
The response from the editor regarding the above mentioned challenge 
confirms my findings from archival data analysis—that domestic parts suppliers, to a 
large extent, are still limited at the material supply and basic production level. To help 
ease this challenge, the government had been promoting local content regulations on 
auto assemblers, which indirectly protected the domestic parts suppliers. China’s 
ultimate purpose of economic reform is to exchange market for technology and 
knowledge. This is especially true in both car assembling and parts supply sectors. On 
one hand, China puts strict local content restriction on whole car assembly plants, 
which forces joint venture auto firms to purchase parts from indigenous suppliers. On 
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the other hand, China recognizes the low capacity in production and quality control of 
domestic suppliers (which by themselves cannot meet global standards) and thus the 
government also promotes equity sharing joint ventures in the parts supply market. By 
doing so, indigenous suppliers at least have the opportunity to work closely with first-
tier global suppliers locally so as to learn global supply chain operation and aim at 
becoming local component specialists. 
While Chinese parts suppliers are eager to learn technology from global firms, 
world leading parts manufacturers desire to get into Chinese market for low 
production costs and proximity to their whole-car-assembling partners. For the above 
reason, a lot of world-class auto parts suppliers have been following the multinational 
auto firms to the Chinese market, such as Delphi Automotive Systems, Bosch, Valeo, 
Siemens, Dana, Allied Signal, Lucas Varity, United Technologies, ITT, TRW, 
Rockwell, Tenneco, Cooper etc. The proportion of joint ventures in the component 
industry increased significantly in the late 1990s. Till 1996, 35% of the local suppliers 
were joint ventures. As shown later in the case of SAIC, several large indigenous 
suppliers have created strategic alliances or joint ventures with foreign-owned 
companies in order to work in collaborative projects with the automobile and parts 
manufacturers or to acquire technological know-how or expertise. These firms have 
achieved high levels of technology, productivity, and quality. All of them have 
acquired international quality and reliability certifications, such as QS-9000, ISO, and 
all are able to supply multiple carmakers in China (Depner & Bathelt, 2005). 
Auto experts are concerned about China’s parts supply market as China’s 
WTO entry resulted in tariffs on imported parts being reduced and local content 
requirement being removed. Once MNEs can easily get into the market with their 
global supply chain, many predicted that indigenous parts producers will be forced 
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out of the game (Ali et al., 2004; Chen, 2002; Fan & Scott, 2003). However, studies 
also showed that the local content requirement enforced in the 1990s successfully 
helped build partner relationship between domestic and global suppliers, as well as 
improving local suppliers efficiency and capacity. Thus, even with the presence of 
free market access, global auto assemblers may prefer the intra-China network they 
developed in the last decades to global outsourcing (Thun, 2004; Wang, 1999; Yang 
& Liu, 2006). Instead of threatening domestic parts suppliers, China’s WTO accession 
is expected to introduce more global benchmarks, which help indigenous parts 
suppliers learn and adapt to international production standards (Veloso, 2000). 
In sum, although China’s auto parts industry contributes much to the 
automotive product exports, indigenous parts suppliers have few competitive 
advantages over global component manufacturers, in term of economy of scale and 
R&D capability. Further consolidation and research investment are needed to gain a 
competitive edge in the global supply chain. 
6.2.4. Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry 
Major auto assemblers invested heavily in the emerging markets, increasing 
production capacity and modernizing existing plants. They are attracted not only by 
the sales growth prospects offered by low motorization rates in developing nations, 
but also by the potential cost reduction that may be obtained through integrating low-
cost manufacturing locations and spreading the vehicle development costs across a 
greater number of markets (Humphrey, 2003). In China, the government promotes the 
development of large business groups in the auto sector so as to concentrate foreign 
investment and help build up competitive Chinese automakers.  
To respond to new market trends and demands, automakers are pursuing a set 
of strategies that are common among major firms (Veloso, 2000). Firstly, automakers 
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are now planning operations on a global scale, with models being launched 
simultaneously in different locations with similar standards. Firms are also trying to 
replicate global supply chain structure, demanding that suppliers set up facilities in 
the new regions where they are present. This strategy has been implemented ever 
since the late 1980s when global auto giants set up production plants and introduced 
global quality standards in developing nations. 
The second strategy is to recognize products around common platforms, 
interchangeable modules, and shared supplier network. The most significant 
characteristic of China’s auto market in 2002 is that competition was switching from 
mainly price war to model creation and replacement. China’s auto market now has 
more than 40 auto brands and over 200 models, among which new models account for 
more than 60% of market shares (CAAM, 2002). Both global and domestic 
automakers invest a lot in R&D to speed up the pace of new model introduction. 
Meanwhile, declining sales per model and short product life-cycles are preventing 
automakers and suppliers from reaching economy of scale in design and 
manufacturing, with a significant adverse impact on cost. By focusing on common 
platforms and interchangeable modules, OEMs are able to make faster and lower cost 
deployment of new solutions across the whole product range while tailoring vehicles 
to a multitude of tastes and preferences of consumers around the world (Xing, 2002); 
this utilizes a combination of cost leadership (in complete modules) and 
differentiation (in whole car model design) strategies (Porter, 1986).  Furthermore, a 
shared supplier network can help improve the suppliers’ economy of scale while 
promoting global quality standards and reducing the cost of vehicle manufacturing. 
For example, one major reason for GM to set up joint facilities in Shanghai area is to 
tap into the established auto supply network between SAIC and VW. 
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To focus investment on model creation and car related services, OEMs are 
becoming less involved in manufacturing and assembly, passing the responsibility of 
designing and manufacturing important modules onto their suppliers. Thus, the third 
strategy is to work with a smaller number of larger specialized suppliers. Major 
criteria for choice of supplier to be a strategic partner include: price and quality 
competitiveness, R&D capacity, economies of scale, and location (for parts with 
substantial logistics costs) (Fan & Scott, 2003). The Chinese component supply 
market is under major consolidation and rationalization process in order to meet the 
above criteria and get more involved in the global auto supply chain. 
Finally, given the increasing importance of design, brand management, and 
customer relationship, assemblers are joining cross-industry constellations that link 
them to the technical and market researchers, financial institutions, parts and service 
suppliers, and final customers.  
Following these global trends, Chinese auto firms are developing large 
business groups, the members of which represent major participants in the auto supply 
chain. Meanwhile, inter-firm linkage with global auto firms encourages technological 
and managerial knowledge transfers which ultimately strengthen the competitive 
power of the Chinese auto industry. 
Although some indigenous automakers are independently designing and 
producing new models, a majority of market shares and car models in the current 
Chinese market are from joint venture plants. On one hand, as shown in Table 12, 
major car models technologically originate from foreign partners. This indicates a 
weakness in domestic R&D capability. On the other hand, Geely and Chery, two 
indigenous auto firms, show growing production capacity and increasing domestic 
market shares. They also plan to export to the international market. Their increasing 
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significance in the auto sector reveals government’s ultimate ambition—to create a 
Chinese designed and globally competitive vehicle brand.  
Table 12 Sales of major passenger car models and tech origins 
Producer Brand Sales Unit Market Share (%) 
Tech 
Origin 
FAW-VW Jetta 153,916 6.88 VW 
SAIC-VW Santana 132,719 5.93 VW 
FAW-Tianjin Xiali 112,919 5.05 Daihatsu 
Guangzhou Honda Accord 105,387 4.71 Honda 
Beijing Hyundai Elantra 102,749 4.59 Hyundai 
SAIC-GM Excelle 92,225 4.12 GM 
SAIC-VW Santana 2000 90,339 4.04 VW 
SAIC-VW Passat 74,877 3.35 VW 
SAIC-GM Regal 72,903 3.26 GM 
FAW-VW Bora 63,283 2.83 VW 
Guangzhou Honda Jazz 59,303 2.65 Honda 
SAIC-GM Sail 57,839 2.59 GM 
Chang'an-Suzuki Flyer 55,854 2.50 Suzuki 
Dongfeng Yueda Kia Qianlima 55,781 2.49 Kia 
Geely Haoqing 55,189 2.47 Self 
Chang'an Suzuki Swift 54,198 2.42 Suzuki 
FAW-Mazda Family 53,205 2.38 Mazda 
Chery QQ 49,366 2.21 Self 
FAW-VW Audi A6 46,177 2.06 VW 
FAW-Toyota Crown 45,654 2.04 Toyota 
Total of Above  1,533,883 68.57  
Note. China Automotive Yearbook, 2003. 
 
The total number of auto firms in China remains high (around 130 in 2003), 
but the number belies a growing concentration within the industry. The three 
dominant business groups—the FAW, Dongfeng, and SAIC—account for 67% of 
sedan and over 50% of total vehicle production in 2003 (see Figure 4 and Table 13) 
(Thun, 2004). Their combined production in 2003 was 1.38 million sedans, and each 
aspired to reach production level of 1 million vehicles by 2005 (Thun, 2004). These 
groups are still not at international levels with respect to costs, but they are mass 
producing passenger vehicles at high volumes that are close to world-class quality and 
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technology. They are competing with other developing nations for mass auto 
production while investing in designing China-branded vehicles. 
FAW
25%
Dongfeng
10%
Other
33%
SAIC
32%
 
Figure 4 Shares of sedan market by manufacturers, 2003 
Note.  Adapted from Thun, 2004, p. 456. 
 
 
Table 13 Top three business group in China auto sector, 2003 
Producer Foreign Partner Capacity Market Share % 
SAIC Chery Daewoo 60,000 2.01
SAIC-GM General Motors 150,000 5.02
SAIC-GM Wuling General Motors 150,000 4.86
SAIC-VW Volkswagen 450,000 15.05
Dongfeng Honda Honda 60,000 2.01
Dongfeng PSA PSA/Citroen 150,000 5.02
Dongfeng Yueda Kia Kia 50,000 1.67
Dongfeng Yulong Nissan 60,000 2.01
FAW Chengdu Toyota 5,000 0.17
FAW-Hainan Mazda 50,000 1.67
FAW-Toyota Toyota/Mazda 100,000 3.34
FAW-VW Volkswagen 270,000 9.03
Total  1,555,000 51.85
Note. China Automotive Yearbook, 2003. 
 
 
As shown in Table 14, all of the top three auto groups have multiple joint 
venture partners (SAIC has the most with 35 international joint ventures in auto-
related industries). From global firms’ perspective, they form multiple joint ventures 
due to low individual capacity of Chinese producers. Whereas from a Chinese 
perspective, multiple partners would translate into partner competition in the Chinese 
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market, which would ultimately speed up technology transfer and market 
rationalization. Major portions of revenue and production volume in Dongfeng and 
SAIC are still from joint venture plants, while FAW seems to be promoting more 
indigenous operation and has joint ventures contribute to a minor amount of revenue 
and total volume.  
Table 14 Top three automotive business groups performance, 2003 
 FAW Dongfeng SAIC 
Number of car producers 2 3 2
Number of truck producers 13 15 5
Number of engine producers 2 3 1
Number of component 
producers 
3 23 44
2002 revenue (US billions) 10.7 8.4 12.8
2002 asset (US billions) 8.9 7.0 9.4
2002 profit (US billions) 2.4 2.2 3.4
2002 ROA 27% 31% 36%
Total R&D personnel 2,594 4,946 2,390
R&D/sales intensity 1.5% 1.5% 1.3%
Number of technical centers 2 1 1
Number of training centers 1 1 1
Number of JVs 2 4 35
Types of JV Car Car, truck, 
engine 
car, truck, 
component 
Foreign partners VW, 
Toyota 
PSA, Nissan, 
Cummins 
GM, VW, 
Delphi, Visteon 
 
JV volume/group volume 85% 100% 100%
JV revenue/group revenue 34% 72% 66%
JV profit/group profit 41% 56% 60%
JV R&D personnel/group R&D 
personnel 
12% 18% 22%
Note. Summarized from China Automotive Yearbook, 2004; Zhao, Anand, & 
Mitchell, 2005, p. 158. 
 
Hutchings and Michailova (2004) suggested that distinctive knowledge 
transfer to host nation operations is vital to build competitive advantage in an alien 
environment. To promote domestic auto firms’ competitive power—rather than make 
China a world auto factory—the government restricted FDI through foreign equity 
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limits and local content requirement. As a result, there was a trend in the early 1990s 
to link an MNE source network with a recipient business group network. Most 
Chinese auto JVs become the intermediaries between those two networks (see Figure 
5). Thus, the knowledge flow through the JV is not limited to a one-to-one 
arrangement (foreign firm-to-local firm) but includes a network-to-network setting. 
Such network-to-network transfers can have far-reaching implications for the 
diffusion of knowledge in an emerging economy (Zhao et al., 2005). Not only could 
such network-to-network structure hasten technology transfer in all areas, MNE 
source network will also bring in global operational benchmarks on which firm 
performance can be evaluated. At the level of business groups, this would translate 
into the increasing use of objective standards when assessing the performance of and 
interaction between member firms. At the level of individual firms, this often means 
more effective accounting and financial management. 
 
Figure 5 Auto IJV and knowledge transfers 
Note. Adopted from Zhao et al., 2005, p. 130. 
MNE Network 
Chinese Business group 
MNE Member Firm 
Member Firm in 
Business Group 
IJV
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If we look further into Chinese business groups, the local partners of most JVs 
are affiliated with local firms from various industries. These firms cover component 
suppliers, distributors, financial organizations, research institutions, legal or 
administrative companies, and other related enterprises. By 2003, there are 21 large 
auto business groups in China, the sum of which represent over 90% of total Chinese 
automotive firms and revenues (China Automotive Yearbook, 2003). Besides being a 
hub between the foreign source network and the recipient business groups, the local 
partners of JVs also act as intermediaries between government and individual firms. 
Although the government has reduced its direct control over the auto industry, the 
core firms of these groups take charge in monitoring the performance of the whole 
industry on behalf of the central government.  
To conclude, auto joint ventures and the network-to-network industry structure 
have successfully promoted the development of Chinese auto industry. Some 
predicted that joint ventures will be unwound once the Chinese are capable of 
competing on their own, given China’s ambition for whole-car design and export 
(“Mixed outlook for auto exports.”, 2005), while others believed that China would 
never completely sever its links with other partners as long as cooperation contributes 
to its advantageous competitiveness, such as opening up foreign markets and 
shrinking costs, which is more reasonable for China following the trend of 
globalization (Chen, 2004; Luo, 2002; Ravenhill, 2005). It is clear that China is 
determined to control domestic auto market through regulatory policies and promote 
export to improve its international competitiveness. 
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6.2.5. The Power of Government in Auto Industry Competitiveness 
6.2.5.1. Government protective power 
As Wang (1999) described, to explore economy of scale in developing nations, 
domestic firms need an entry barrier placed on foreign counterparts. A certain 
protection period is necessary for the local carmakers to develop so as to compete 
with well-financed and technologically advanced MNEs in the future. In the early 
stages of China’s economic development, the key carmakers were all state-owned 
enterprises to which the government could provide the massive financing necessary to 
create domestic giants. Due to the importance of the component industry, car part 
tariffs were kept high, which indirectly encourage businesses to set up domestic part 
supply networks and to increase inter-industry linkages and technology spillover. As 
the government considers the giant automakers and their supplier networks strong 
enough for international competition, the government gradually releases its protection 
and welcomes global competition. This pattern of industrialization is China’s plan in 
strengthening its domestic automobile industry, where government plays an important 
role in each phase of the plan. 
The protectionism in China’s auto industry in the last two decades was 
inspired by the development pattern in Japan and Korea. Both countries demonstrated 
that active government interventions contribute to the quick expansion of the export-
oriented automobile industry (Wang, 1999). Therefore, the automotive industry is the 
first among Chinese industries to be backed by a formal state industrial policy. To 
maintain control over the auto industry, China regulated inward investments through 
different tools, including trade barriers, screening, equity limits, and local content 
requirement, to protect domestic automakers and narrow the technology gap.  
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Trade barriers 
A tariff rate on automobiles was set at 180-220% before 1986. Regarding the 
non-tariff barriers, China applied restrictive import licensing to a number of product 
categories including motor vehicles, key parts of vehicles, crane lorries, motorcycles, 
and key parts of motorcycles. Some other trade barriers included foreign exchange 
controls, state monopoly of trading companies and domestic marketing, and quality 
and technical standards regulations (Chen, 2002; Depner & Bathelt, 2005).  
However, serious consequences resulted which indicated the failure of the 
trade barrier measures. First of all, instead of the expected reduction due to high tariff 
rates and low import quotas, imported automobiles sales increased because of 
growing demand, and this increase, accompanied by widespread car smuggling, 
limited domestic auto productions. Secondly, MNEs quick to invest in Chinese 
ventures benefited from protectionism through short-term profits (i.e. auto parts 
imports from their home nations) without promoting domestic auto industry 
development. Finally, the high profit rate led to the proliferation of shoddy car 
producers in China. The industry became further fragmented in the late 1980s, which 
countered the government’s intent to control import, promote local production and 
rationalize the auto market. 
Screening  
Multi-level authorities regulate and monitor foreign investments in the auto 
sector. The State Planning Commission is responsible for formulating the national 
economic plan. It has virtual control over the units and types of vehicles the joint 
ventures can produce. Moreover, it also has to approve the new joint ventures that are 
greatly dependent on the Commission for ensuring approval of a constant, reliable 
supply of raw materials and energy sources (Harwit, 1995). 
 55
The next level of bureaucracy in the automotive industry involves 
• The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT): 
responsible for approving JV contracts with foreign capital. They will make 
sure the capital investment and foreign exchange will be balanced by the 
approved JVs. 
• The Ministry of Machine-Building and Electronics Industry (MMEI): 
working together with its subordinate company, the China National 
Automotive Industrial Corporation (CNAIC), plays the formulating role in 
China’s automotive planning section. MMEI is responsible for directing the 
allocation of raw materials among industries, investment in these industries, 
and appointment of personnel in the areas it directed (Invest in China, 2005). 
• The Ministry of Aeronautics and Astronautics (MAAS): a marketer for the 
domestic industrial-parts factories. Its responsibility lies in promoting sales of 
indigenous auto parts to various manufacturers.  
The final bureaucracy, the State Council Automobile Leading Small Group, 
was first established in 1987. It consisted of representatives from various 
administrative groups that worked to coordinate national policies (act as secondary 
examiners). It ceased to function by 1989 but has reformulated on call. For example, 
the group was formed again to discuss the impact of China’s WTO accession on the 
auto industry between 1998 and 2000 (see Figure 6 for the state organizational 
structure in auto-related screening).  
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Figure 6 The state organizational structure 
Besides the central government, local municipal authorities also play 
significant roles in China’s auto sector. At the top level, mayoral participation in 
capital intensive industries (such as auto manufacturing) is very common. Moreover, 
the composition of municipal committees (economic commission, planning 
commission, and foreign economic relations commission) indicates great control of 
government power. The study conducted by Harwit (1995) found that in the early 
1990s in some major automotive production cities, the heads of automotive 
corporations were also powerful members of the economic committee(s). An example 
he gave is that a board chairman of one auto joint venture was also the vice-chairman 
of the machinery and electronics department under the municipal economic 
commission (Harwit, 1995).  
At the firm level, automotive industrial groups take charge in monitoring the 
overall performance of the auto cluster in each city. Studies showed that in Shanghai 
and Guangzhou, automotive industrial corporations are actively involved in auto 
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financing, supplier network, sales distribution, and after-sale service functions 
(Francois & Spinanger, 2004; Harwit, 1995; Sit & Liu, 2000).  
Government involvement in business administration could present significant 
obstacles to the auto firms. Harwit’s (1995) study of Beijing Jeep and its crisis 
resolution illustrated the inefficiency of the state and local government structures. 
When problem was encountered, none of the government agencies (multi-layered 
state and municipal commissions) could react quickly or effectively. More seriously, 
various bureaucracies showed disunity in their approaches to the problem. Thus, to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government monitoring, a majority of 
screening tasks have been given to local government. Decentralization from national 
authorities to the local government is a successful organizational restructure, since it 
improves government efficiency and allows the market to promote resource relocation 
and process optimization. Jurisdictional competition among local governments can 
also improve market efficiency through sorting and matching, which is a necessary 
process to create thriving markets in the transition economy.  
Foreign equity limits 
MNEs participating in China’s whole-car-assembly projects or the three key 
component projects (motors, air bags, and ABS) are subject to the maximum equal 
share holding limit. In reality however, later operations proved that this requirement 
did not achieve the objective of management control and technology enhancement as 
desired by the policymakers. Nearly all the foreign investors have tremendous 
discretion on the operation of joint ventures, even though they only have minority 
equity shares. For example, Citroën, with 25% of share holding in the joint venture, 
controls important management activities such as sales, purchasing, and finance, as 
well as production control and quality monitoring (Harwit, 1995). Similar situation 
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can be found in most of the joint ventures in the auto sector. As shown in Jing’s (2005) 
study, sectors with advanced technology and skills (such as engine development and 
electronic gas control system) are still dominated by foreign partners. 
Slow technology transfer becomes the tradeoff of equity control over auto 
joint ventures. Teece’s (1981) study showed that global firms that possess superior 
assets will opt for a strategy that enables them to retain tight control over foreign 
operations in order to protect the value of those assets. Therefore, joint ventures 
would usually purchase major components or technologies from parent companies. 
The foreign investors intend to prolong the purchasing period to maximize the profit 
generated from transfer pricing. That being said, China’s equity limit can at least 
guarantee that domestic firms have half the stake of the market; otherwise wholly-
owned foreign firms will most probably exclude the domestic counterparts. Hence 
technology transfer becomes a secondary consideration in the transition period. 
Local content and R&D requirements  
The local content and technology transfer requirements are imposed to pursue 
two of China’s most important policy goals: complex industrial development and self-
reliance. These requirements were combined with varied tariff rates to encourage 
increased local content of assembled vehicles. For passenger cars whose local content 
exceeded 80%, the tariff rate on imported parts and components was 40%, and for 
local content of 60-80% and below 60%, the tariff was 60% and 75% respectively 
(China Automotive Yearbook, 1995). This policy was designed to create 
technological linkages to the component industry and to strengthen the indigenous 
capabilities in whole car design and manufacturing. By imposing local content 
requirements, the Chinese government compels MNEs to use locally produced 
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components and to provide employment opportunity, which allows indigenous auto 
firms to benefit from the technology spillover effect.  
 Auto joint ventures are also required to set up an internal technical center that 
is capable for model adaptation and development of future generations of products 
following global standards. The 1994 industrial policy provided three strategic 
guidelines for developing indigenous R&D capabilities. First, vehicle assemblers 
should include 5-10% of total reinvestment for developing or expanding their 
technical centers. Second, R&D spending should reach at least 2-3% of sales within 
five to ten years. Third, key component suppliers should apply 10-20% of their 
reinvestment to set up R&D facilities and technical centers. The government will 
provide financial and taxation support for joint R&D projects in the automotive 
industry (China Automotive Yearbook, 1995).  
The beneficial spillover effects of local content application were manifested 
gradually by the mid-90s. For example, Shanghai Volkswagen formed the Shanghai 
Santana Local Content Co-operative (SSLCC) by bringing together the parts makers, 
banks, universities, and research institutes. Being a member of SSLCC means a long-
term contract and a steady supply of components, which are the key incentives for the 
component suppliers to execute continuous quality improvement. Many local parts 
suppliers either import technologies or form alliances with global component 
manufacturers so as to integrate into the complete manufacturing system. 
6.2.5.2. Automotive industrial policy 
A national automobile industry policy was issued in 1994 (the 1994 Policy), 
which aimed at developing large automotive groups while limiting foreign 
participation. The state expressed the intent to develop three or four large automotive 
groups, six or seven key auto plants, and eight to ten major motorcycle plants. In the 
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long term, by 2010, the state would promote conglomeration among individual 
enterprises across different industries, so that there would be three or four auto groups 
that are internationally competitive. Moreover, this policy prohibited foreign 
companies from establishing more than one auto joint venture making the same type 
of vehicle in China (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
(MOFCOM), 2005).  
In the intervening ten years, the 1994 policy could no longer accommodate the 
rapid development of the auto industry. A new automotive industry development 
policy (the New Policy) was formulated in 2004 to explain China’s WTO 
commitments, the development of China’s economy and China’s aims to turn the auto 
industry into one of its pillar industries. Several significant changes are summarized 
below (Lall, 2004; MOFCOM, 2005). 
• Development orientation: the New Policy aims at keeping the auto industry at 
pace with economic and social change, and aims at a policy based on 
sustainable development. For example, the New Policy encourages the 
development of cars with advanced energy-saving technology, small 
displacement and recycling materials. 
• Trademarks on products: there was no trademark protection provision in the 
1994 Policy. The New Policy, in an effort to promote first class domestic 
enterprises and heighten public awareness of domestic brands, entails brand 
protection, which requires all domestically produced cars and assembly parts 
to carry registered trademarks or service marks. 
• Market access administration: the New Policy creates a standardized 
procedure to allow the state and local administrations to collectively issue 
notices on eligible auto manufacturers and products (bypass the hierarchical 
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authentication procedure). In addition, the threshold of local government’s 
discretion to approve automotive investments since China’s WTO entry has 
been raised from $30 to $150 million US. 
• New investment management: 1). The New Policy provides a more favorable 
approval mode for auto investors. The approval process is simplified for 
market-adjusted expansion and investment, which allows existing automakers 
to expand into auto part or related businesses with quicker access. The 
approval process remains the same for newly established companies or 
existing automakers that manufacture vehicles in a different category. 2). The 
New Policy keeps the limitation provided in the 1994 Policy regarding the 
equity interests that is allowed for the foreign party in a vehicle assembly joint 
venture (50% maximum), while foreign components manufacturers are not 
subject to such limitation (to promote development and attract more FDI in the 
component sector). The New Policy also allows foreign investors to invest in 
multiple joint ventures with different domestic automakers (to encourage a 
broaden range of model introduction and knowledge transfer). 3). A minimum 
of $250 million US must be invested for new automotive manufacturing 
projects, of which $100 million US must be self-owned capital. Such a project 
must include a product R&D organization with an investment of no less than 
$60 million US. 
• Automotive loans: following the New Policy, various supporting facilities will 
be built to foster the implementation of auto financing. For example, a 
maximum of 80% of the auto price could be granted for automobile loan 
according to the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). 
Furthermore, with the provision of a simplified investment review procedure, 
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many auto assembly firms are expected to share the auto financing and the 
after-sale service markets, as complementary services provided with their auto 
sales. This provision will significantly benefit the consumers by providing a 
simplified financing path and reducing the risk. 
• WTO commitments: the most significant impact on the auto industry is the 
removal of protective policies. By 2006, import quota will be abolished and 
the average tariff on whole cars will be reduced to 25%, on parts and 
components to 10%. The New Policy provides the eleventh chapter on “import 
management” to promote a non-biased marketplace for local and imported 
cars. China agreed to comply with the WTO protocol on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) upon entry to the WTO. Under TRIMs, China 
cannot subsidize export performance or require that companies use locally 
produced parts and components, restrict the types of vehicles produced, or 
maintain separate regulations for domestic and imported products. 
As China transitions to a free market economy, the government continues to 
modify the auto industry policy to meet changing market conditions. However, the 
author’s interview with the auto consultant revealed that it is difficult to align the 
industry policy with the underdeveloped free market due to the problems remaining 
from the planned economy. 
Indigenous auto firms find it difficult to operate under the free market 
rules. Problems like disorderly competition, repetitive investment, and 
lack of production of models demanded by the market still exist in 
China’s auto industry, which demonstrate a mismatch between 
industry policies and the current market situation. Therefore, China 
needs to further adapt its industry policy in order to effectively address 
and solve the market problems.  
 
The central government has used its restrictive power to regulate and control 
FDI, which serves as a substitute for its inability to support domestic auto industry 
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development. Government policy helps concentrate FDI in key firms in exchange for 
granting foreign firms access to the domestic market. While local partners have the 
opportunity to learn technological and managerial skills, foreign partners benefit from 
getting access into the market and bringing in global benchmarks for quality and price 
optimization. Although China has made significant progression in developing its auto 
industry, the central government still needs to further adapt the industry policy to 
address new market problems. 
6.2.6. WTO Entry and its Impact on China’s Automobile Industry 
The transition from a command economy to a market-based economy has been 
remarkably successful in China. After 15 years of negotiations, China finally jointed 
the WTO in December 2001. Agarwal and Wu (2004) predicted that China’s auto 
assembly and distribution sectors will face increasing foreign competition, which will 
lead to industry-wide resource reallocation and consolidation such as mergers and 
acquisitions. 
China will cut tariffs on cars, buses, and trucks to an average of 25% by 2006 
(see Table 15). Although this figure is still high given the low profit margin in the 
auto sector and the definition of free trade, the Chinese government insists on keeping 
a reduced tariff for some time in order to provide some leverage to domestic 
producers. Furthermore, tariffs on more than 160 auto parts and components will be 
reduced from an average of 25% in 2001 to 10% by July 1, 2006. China has also 
committed to increase its import quotas on motor vehicle products by 15% annually, 
based on quota values in 2000, and to eliminate import quotas entirely on January 1, 
2005 (see Table 16). China will eliminate import licenses for engines in 2003; 
motorcycles, trucks, and buses in 2004; and passenger vehicles in 2005 (Invest in 
China, 2006; Koehn, 2002; Xing, 2002). 
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Table 15 Scheduled WTO-mandated tariffs of cars, buses, and trucks (%) 
Cars 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006
 Jan. 1 Jan.1 Jan. 1 Jan. 1 Jan. 1 Jan. 1 July 1
Engine size 
Less than 3 liters 70.0 43.8 38.2 34.2 30.0 28.0 25.0
3 liters and up 80.0 50.7 37.6 37.6 30.3 28.0 25.0
Buses (number of seats) 
30 and up 45.0 37.5 33.3 29.2 25.0  
20-29 60.0 47.5 40.0 32.5 25.0  
10-19 65.0 47.5 40.0 32.5 25.0  
10-19 (diesel) 65.0 38.4 32.9 27.5 25.0  
Gasoline Trucks (Gross vehicle weight) 
8 tons and up 30.0 21.0 18.0 15.0 15.0  
14-20 tons 30.0 24.0 22.0 20.0 20.0  
5-14 tons 40.0 30.0 25.0 23.3 20.0  
Less than 5 tons 50.0 37.5 30.0 29.2 25.0  
Note. WTO, 2001, Annex 1A, section IV. 
 
 
Table 16 Import quotas on motor vehicle products (million units) 
Description 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Motor vehicles and parts 6,000 7,935 9,125 10,494 No quota 
Motorcycles and parts 286 376 432 497 No quota 
Cranes and chassis 88 116 133 153 No quota 
Note. WTO, 2001, Annex 1A, section IV. 
 
China is required to open certain services sectors as well. These include 
distribution, financing, insurance, road transportation, storage and warehousing, 
maintenance and repair, and leasing and rental. WTO terms will generally permit 
wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries in these areas by 2005. China is required to totally 
remove the local content and the technology transfer requirements after its five year 
transition period in 2006. Table 17 provides a summary of China’s general WTO 
commitment. The interview with the professor specifically addressed the advantage of 
allowing foreign investment in Chinese capital market. According to the professor, 
the entry of global financial institutions will provide a better and a more convenient 
auto-financing platform for customers. More importantly, the introduction of a 
 65
developed credit evaluation system and a customer-oriented culture will stimulate 
reform and advancement in the domestic financing market. 
Table 17 Summary of China's general WTO commitments 
 Before WTO entry After WTO entry 
Tariffs 200% in 1980s; 100% in 
1990s 
25% by 2006 
Import Quota 30,000 vehicles a year 
allowed from foreign 
carmakers 
Quota increased 20% a 
year, phased out by 2005 
Local Content and 
Technology Transfer 
40% in first year of 
production, increasing to 
60%, 80% in second and 
third years, respectively. 
Require to invest in R&D 
locally 
No local-content 
requirement. No 
regulation on the 
establishment of R&D or 
training center 
Foreign Participation in 
Sales, Distribution and 
other Services 
Limited to wholesaling 
through joint ventures; 
prohibited from 
consolidating sales 
organizations of imports 
Will be allowed to own 
vehicle wholesale, retail 
organizations; integrated 
sales organizations 
permitted by 2006 
Auto Financing for 
Chinese Domestic 
Customers 
Foreign, nonblank financial 
institutions prohibited from 
providing financing 
Foreign, nonblank 
financing permitted in 
selected cities prior to 
gradual national rollout 
Note. Adapted from Gao, 2002, p. 148. 
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China’s auto industry is heavily impacted by its WTO entry. Consolidation has 
been taking place in the industry in order to generate economy of scales and 
competitive product quality. Major Chinese auto companies have also formed 
multiple joint ventures with MNEs for the same purpose. The question is whether 
Chinese auto firms will have enough time to phase out their infancy before July 2006 
when tariffs on autos decrease from the rate of 100% and 80% to 25%.  
Some analysts thought that China’s indigenous automobile industry would be 
a major victim of WTO accession (Han & Kim, 2003; Kister, 1998; Lin & Lin, 2001; 
Qin, 2004; Wang, 1999). According to research conducted by Yang and Liu (2006), 
the expected changes to the automobile industry are significant: 15.1% reduction in 
output, 14.5% reduction in employment, 105.1% increase in import and 7.8% 
reduction in export. At the end of 2001 it was forecast that car prices would decline 
by around one third within a few years and that imports of passenger cars would 
increase by 30% (Luo, 2002). Growing demand caused by price reduction would 
favor imported vehicles, and domestic auto producers were predicted to finally lose 
their competitive edge in Chinese market and the global auto industry. 
However, others have an optimistic view of the future of the Chinese auto 
industry. When analyzing China’s national strategy for internationalization, scholars 
concluded that China agreed to remove trade barriers based on a positive estimation 
of the power of domestic automakers (Ravenhill, 2005; Sutton, 2004; Xing, 2002; 
Zhu & Nyland, 2005). Although WTO agreement gives MNEs the opportunity to 
freely import parts and components, existing auto assemblers may prefer the 
established supplier network in China because of improved production and design 
capacity of domestic suppliers. Thus, China’s WTO entry should be considered an 
opportunity for domestic automakers to get into the global market.   
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Since researchers promote conflicting views regarding the future of China’s 
automotive industry, the author obtained information about the 2006 government 
policy by talking with a parts import manager from Hainan Mazda Co., Ltd. 
According to the manager, the new policy is approved by the State Economic and 
Planning Commission, the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission, 
China Automotive Technology and Research Center, and the State Environment 
Protection Administration, and is considered a replacement of protective policy after 
China’s WTO accession. China is required to remove all trade barriers by 2006. 
Instead of protecting the automotive industry, the government is encouraging R&D in 
indigenous auto firms by setting up flagship enterprises. Chery, Geely, and Yutong 
who have produced China-branded cars are the candidate firms. They will establish 
centers for technical research, human resource training, and quality control and 
standardization; and the government will provide funds and human resource support 
in research projects. By doing so, the central government want to help its indigenous 
automakers become self-reliant firms with total capacity for design, manufacture, and 
management. 
In sum, China’s WTO entry brings both opportunity and threat into the 
automotive industry. The result is yet to be seen, but intensified competition, growing 
auto demand, and improved price-quality schema are predicted to radically affect 
China’s auto industry following global standards. 
6.3. Overall of the Diamond Framework 
Table 18 provides a summary of the determinants in the diamond model based 
on the analyses in previous sections. The structure and measurement levels (High (H), 
Medium (M), and Low (L), and a transition assessment, i.e. M-H (Medium to High)) 
are adapted from Barragan’s (2005) study on Mexico’s competitive position. The 
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Chinese auto industry could be classified as less competitive when measured against 
Porter’s export-related indicators, because a majority of the current production serves 
domestic market with few export amounts. However, a large demand market attracts 
both Chinese and foreign investments in factor and supply chain development. 
Industry policy introduced in the late 1980s helped set up the partnership format in 
auto assembly and parts manufacture sectors, which dominated Chinese auto market 
for a long time. Increasing domestic competition helped speed up the rationalization 
process, including supply chain efficiency improvement, auto assemblers’ 
consolidation and restructures, technology advancement in parts supply and whole car 
designs, and so forth.  
In China, government’s interaction with all four determinants contributes 
significantly to the fast development of its automobile industry, which confirms 
Porter’s discussion on the role of government. In general, government is able to 
concentrate funds in developing factor conditions, promote domestic demand for 
motor vehicles, direct foreign investment in major auto groups, and encourage 
technology transfer in indigenous supply network. Specifically, the government 
modified the industry policy in order to effectively regulate FDI and assist the 
industry progression. For example, it imposed trade barriers and local content 
requirements on auto joint ventures to simulate localization rate; it required the 
establishment of technical center to promote technology transfer; and it utilized 
China’s WTO accession as another tool to introduce its domestic auto giants into the 
global market.  
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Table 18 Assessment of the diamond of Chinese automobile industry 
 Factor 
Conditions 
Demand 
Conditions 
Related and 
Supporting 
Industries 
Firm strategy, 
Structure, 
and Rivalry 
The role of 
government 
 
Assessment L-M M L M M-H 
Source of 
Competitiveness 
Basic 
industrial 
infrastructure 
Cheap 
production 
cost 
Skilled labor 
Increased 
R&D 
investment 
Reduced 
regulation in 
capital market 
Growing 
domestic 
demand 
Growing 
middle class 
with 
sophisticate 
demand. 
Unexplored 
inland 
provinces 
Fragmented 
industry 
Lack of 
economy of 
scale 
Low R&D 
capabilities 
Dependent 
on foreign 
technology 
Lack of 
experience 
of global 
supply chain 
operation 
and quality 
standards 
Growing 
competition 
between JVs, 
indigenous 
firms, and 
global 
automakers 
Ongoing firm 
consolidation 
and market 
efficiency 
improvement 
  
 
 
Frees capital 
market to 
promote 
expenditures 
Trade 
barriers 
Central 
monitoring 
Equity 
limitation 
Local 
content and 
tech-transfer 
requirements 
Promote 
indigenous 
design 
capacity 
WTO 
commitment 
Active in all 
competitive 
determinants 
 
6.4. Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) 
Following Porter’s discussion on the competitiveness of industry clusters, 
SAIC (and its major auto assembly partners—VW and GM) and the development of 
Shanghai automotive industry cluster provides a success story for industry 
development where governments, national and municipal, not only provide advanced 
infrastructure but play an active role in formulating industry structure. 
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Neither GM nor VW has achieved their prodigious success manufacturing cars 
in China alone. Although they compete, both giants are linked to the same Chinese 
partner—Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation, or SAIC—which owns half of 
the operations and shares half of the profits. These joint ventures are a big success for 
SAIC which has more than doubled in size since 2000. In the year of 2003, it 
produced 612,216 cars with VW and GM, a startling increase of 57% from 2002 
(SAIC, 2004). That has catapulted SAIC onto Fortune’s list of the world’s largest 
companies at No. 461, with revenues of $1.43 billion US and profit of $83.3 million 
US in 2003 (SAIC, 2004). SAIC has an enormous appetite for growth and is already 
casting its eyes beyond China’s borders. Officials have openly declared their intention 
to become one of the world’s six largest automakers by 2020, joining GM, Toyota, 
Ford, Daimler-Chrysler, and VW (Taylor III, 2004).  
SAIC has devised a multi-pronged strategy for expansion. Inside China, it will 
continue to support the growth of its joint ventures with VW and GM, both of which 
have announced plans to more than double productions over the next three years. 
SAIC is also targeting foreign markets. It is taking a 48.9% stake in South Korea’s 
Ssangyong Motor, primarily a maker of sport-utility vehicles. SAIC will introduce 
Ssangyong sales in China in exchange for a foothold in the Korean market. The new 
investment should help SAIC fend off challenges from its chief domestic rivals, FAW 
and Dongfeng Motor. As the third leg of its growth plan, SAIC expects to develop 
and sell a passenger car in China in 2007 under its own logo1. 
In regard to the supply market, by 1991, many of the parts producers that were 
originally controlled by different authorities had become integrated into the SAIC 
group. SAIC now consists of different companies and establishments that 
                                                 
1 Statistical facts and information discussed in the following case studies are incorporated from 
previous studies, as specified by authors, or otherwise from SAIC, SGM, SVW, or related company 
websites. A complete researched document list is provided in Appendix B. 
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manufacture cars, trucks, buses, and motorcycles, as well as parts and equipments. By 
the end of 2001, SAIC had established 55 joint ventures with other automobile and 
component manufacturers and employed almost 62,000 people (see Figure 7) (Depner 
& Bathelt, 2005; SAIC, 2004). The resulting supplier network developed into one of 
the most advanced in China. Shanghai and its neighboring provinces also have the 
largest conglomeration of parts makers in China. SAIC’s strategy in this process is to 
integrate as many suppliers as possible into its own network so as to develop broad 
competencies in the auto production. 
 
 
Figure 7 Composition of Shanghai automotive industry corporation 
Note. Percentages indicate share holdings of SAIC in each partner organization. SAIC 
used to hold 20% equity in Chery but released by the end of 2003 due to a legal 
problem discussed in later section. Adapted from Depner & Bathelt, 2005, p. 62. 
 
It is worth mentioning that SAIC has a policy to sign contracts with more than 
one supplier for each component. This not only secures its supplies (for reasons of 
insufficient transportation or other unexpected problems such as shortage of power 
SAIC 
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SAIC-GM Wuling 
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SAIC-Yizheng Automotive 
Co.  (Subsidiary) 
Shanghai Automotive 
Co. (Subsidiary) 
GM-Daewoo JV 
(South Korea) 10% 
Around 50 joint ventures 
with foreign part makers 
Various service 
companies 
Municipality of 
Shanghai (Majority 
of Shares) 
Shanghai Volkswagen 
Automotive Co. 50% 
 72
supply in some areas), but also promotes competition among the suppliers. The 
competition undoubtedly pressures the suppliers in upgrading technology and raising 
efficiency (Lee, 2000). Specifically for the latter reason, SAIC (and other major 
indigenous auto firms) have established multiple joint ventures in the auto assembly 
sector as well (SVW, SGM, SGM Wuling, etc.). 
Understanding the SAIC—one of the earliest established and now the leading 
domestic auto groups in China—could offer significant insight on the performance of 
most auto joint ventures in China. Currently, SAIC’s joint ventures with VW and GM 
contribute to a major portion of its operation, and thus in the next sections the author 
incorporated case facts about its partnership with VW and GM and analyzed the firm 
strategy, supplier network, involvement of governments, and potential problems with 
technology transfer and business governance. 
6.4.1. General History of SVW and SGM 
Not only did Shanghai present an advantage as a potential market, but 
Shanghai’s heavy industrial infrastructure also made major contributions to Shanghai 
VW (SVW) and Shanghai GM (SGM). A larger number of parts factories, together 
with the extant Shanghai car plants and the city’s steel and other heavy industries, 
cried out for the final ingredients necessary for rapid development: modern 
technology and management skills.  
An automobile cluster began to develop in Shanghai in the 1980s, thanks to 
strong government support at different levels. To upgrade the national automobile 
industry following international standards and to avoid an influx of automobile 
imports, the central government started negotiation with VW in 1978 for the 
establishment of a joint auto production firm. During that entire year, the country’s 
state-owned auto factories produced only 15,500 vehicles, and the industry was 
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characterized by old-fashioned, low-quality cars that were produced with outdated 
equipment in a labor-intensive process (Kiefer, 1998). Chinese official pressed the 
idea of building autos for export and insisted on auto-parts localization. The German 
counterpart, however, explained the necessity of auto-part import at the first stage and 
proposed the idea of localization as China became more experienced in producing 
quality part supplies. Within this cooperative atmosphere, the contract was signed in 
1984. This joint venture was owned 50% by Volkswagen, 25% by SAIC, 15% by the 
Bank of China’s Shanghai Trust and Consultancy Corporation, and 10% by the China 
National Automotive Industrial Corporation. The involvement of Chinese partners 
revealed careful forethought: “The Bank of China could provide or guarantee needed 
loans, SAIC would have an interest in solving local problems, and CNAIC could be a 
link to the central planner.” (Harwit, 1995, p. 153). 
To reduce its dependence on VW and to stimulate technology transfer after 
one decade of cooperation, SAIC decided to engage in the joint venture with GM in 
the early 1990s. SAIC and GM signed a contract to jointly set up Shanghai GM 
production facilities in Pudong in 1997. GM was anxious to win this joint venture 
because it believed that SAIC was the best automobile company in China. Indeed, 
SAIC was highly profitable due to many advantages. Notably, the Chinese 
government had chosen SAIC to be the primary passenger car producer enabling it to 
acquire the most relevant technological experiences, more so than any other domestic 
company. However, the obvious disadvantage of working with SAIC was its existing 
joint venture with VW which was one of GM’s global competitors and which had 
dominated the Chinese passenger car market since the mid-80s (see Table 19). Since 
its establishment, SGM has grown into one of the largest car producers in China. 
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Between 2001 and 2003, GM increased its market share in China substantially, from 
2.7 to 9.9% (“Shanghai GM supply chain system.”, 2005). 
Table 19 Total car production in China and SVW's share, 1990-2003 (1,000 units) 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 
A: Total 40.0 162.7 268.7 393.0 507.1 607.1 1,092.0 2,020.2
B: SVW 18.5 65.0 115.3 200.2 235.0 253.12 301.1 396.0
B/A (%) 46.3 39.9 42.9 50.9 46.3 41.7 27.6 19.6
Note. China Automotive Yearbook, various issues; SVW, 2005. 
6.4.2. Auto Supplier Cluster in Shanghai Area 
The development of the automobile industry in the city was strongly supported 
by municipal policies, including infrastructure development, labor market, and 
industrial policies. In addition, to stimulate broad manufacturing competencies and to 
integrate Chinese suppliers within the region, the central government enforced local-
content regulations on those auto joint ventures to spur the development of a regional 
production network with substantial local linkages.  
Meanwhile, there has been a strong tendency in the international automobile 
industry to develop hierarchical supplier networks and shift the developing, 
manufacturing, and assembly responsibilities of important modules to the first-tier 
suppliers. Along with the globalization strategy of the automobile producers, large 
first-tier suppliers were also required to follow their auto assembly partners and set up 
production facilities in other nations (Sadler, 1998). As a consequence, VW 
demanded that important first-tier suppliers establish production facilities in China, 
preferably within the region. However, production volume (less than 20,000 units in 
1990) at that time was too small for global suppliers to set up mass production 
facilities in Shanghai.  
In the initial years after production was launched, SVW still imported most 
parts and components for the production of the VW Santana from overseas, a large 
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part of which was from Germany. At that time, there were basically no firms in the 
region that could have supplied the parts that were needed. However, the Chinese 
government threatened to impose a production limit on SVW if the firm would not 
increase its local content in production. To achieve the 70% local content regulation 
but at the same time to ensure global quality standards, VW and the Chinese 
government worked interactively in promoting joint venture partnerships in the auto 
parts sector.  
Currently, among the suppliers of SVW, sixty have set up equity joint ventures 
with foreign companies and 120 have transferred technologies from developed 
countries. Working together with leading global component manufacturers, Chinese 
indigenous parts suppliers have been able to elevate themselves from the role of raw 
material suppliers to local system integrators by introducing, absorbing and 
assimilating overseas technology. As shown in SAIC’s supplier network, one supplier 
firm for SAIC, the Shanghai STEC Transportation Electric Co., Ltd, has become a 
small business group itself. It has created five subsidiary JVs, as well as a technical 
center in Shanghai. The firm has the capability to design and manufacture complete 
modules for its customers (SAIC, 2004). The JV is still reliant on the foreign partner 
for technology, but the relationship is a partnership rather than complete dependence. 
By supplying to SVW and SGM, the company is becoming a supplier to many other 
auto assemblers in China and aiming at exporting to the world. 
Global component and parts producers also benefit from partnering with 
indigenous suppliers through access to cheap material and labor and reduced risk of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries in an unfamiliar environment. For instance, Ford 
established a joint venture with a Chinese partner to produce various kinds of 
automotive-used glass in 1992. Allied Signal invested $27.4 million US in its wholly 
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owned subsidiary producing turbochargers in Pudong New Area of Shanghai in 1994. 
ITT built its joint ventures for manufacturing breaking equipment. GKN started 
manufacturing transmission shafts in 1989. Bosch, one of the world’s largest auto part 
and component producers, signed a giant JV contract (a total investment of $2.7 
billion US) with a group of Chinese companies in 1996 (“Shanghai GM.”, 2005). 
To conclude, joint ventures between global components suppliers and SAIC 
seem to offer advantages to both sides. SAIC benefits from the technology transfer 
while MNEs are able to use existing production facilities, acquire materials or parts 
through established channels, and get access to SAIC’s partners in the supply chain. 
The result is positive: in 2002, SVW had 371 suppliers that were located in China. 
The local content in the production of cars ranged from 40% for the newly introduced 
VW Polo to 93% of the VW Santana. At SAIC’s another partner plant, SGM, the 
localization rate for its Buick sedan had reached 70%. The firm imported only $140 
million from the United States in 2002 as compared to the annual parts import of $700 
million US in 2000 (Shanghai General Motors, 2006). 
6.4.3. Joint Ventures Firm Strategy and Competition 
SAIC’s strategy is clear—to form multiple auto JVs with different global 
firms and to benefit from competitions between those partners, in regard to 
technology transfer, new model introduction, and supply market rationalization. 
SAIC’s experience with GM and VW proved this strategy, and GM seems to do a 
better job in quality control, technology adaptation, and accurate appraisals of 
domestic demand market than its competitor VW. While VW and GM are 
increasingly going head to head in the marketplace as they expand their product lines, 
SAIC may find itself competing with both when its own car goes on sale. At the same 
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time, VW and GM run the risk of being shunted aside as China’s domestic auto 
industry develops. 
In July 2004, national auto sales rose only 3.7% over the same period in 2003 
(CAAM, 2005). The growth slowdown has had a significant impact on VW who was 
losing market shares because of an aging product line and increased competition. In 
2002, cars made by SVW had 27.6% of the China market; in 2003 they slipped to 
19.6%, and for the first seven months of 2004, they fell further to 15.5% (Xu, 2005).   
VW’s difficulties have created an opportunity for GM, which passed SVW 
briefly in June 2004 to become the market leader. “Over the past few years, Chinese 
consumers have become more savvy shoppers through greater access to information” 
(“The middle class.”, 2001), said Phil Murtaugh (CEO of GM China) at the 2001 
China Business Summit, and “they have higher expectations for the products and their 
quality.” (“The middle class.”, 2001).  He pointed to the dramatic increase of internet 
usage and the greater number of Chinese auto publications. “China’s growing middle 
class itself represents a sophisticated customer base for a broaden product mix and 
thus fierce competition,” Murtaugh said (“The middle class.”, 2001). A careful 
evaluation of changing domestic consumers and a close relationship with Chinese 
engineers in its technical center keeps GM consistently in the leading position in 
Chinese passenger car market.  
Specifically for business operation, the two joint ventures have adapted 
divergent manufacturing and technology development strategies. SVW has invested 
heavily in automation, while SGM relies more on manual labor. In the SGM 
workshop where steel stampings are fused together, about 75% of the welding is done 
by hand; in GM’s U.S. plants, only 5% is performed manually. Since hand welding 
produces more variability in results, GM performs more quality checks in China. The 
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labor-intensive system seems to work. Both VW and GM have created technical 
centers to train Chinese engineers and modify Western design for the Chinese market, 
while GM seems do a better job (detail is discussed in the next section). 
GM’s entry into the Chinese market and its cooperation with SAIC also 
initiated a number of changes in the product strategy of SVW, as desired by the 
Chinese. The firm now produces different models in Shanghai—the “Santana”, 
“Santana 2000”, “Passat”, and “Polo”. SVW started to produce the “Gol” in Shanghai 
in 2002, a model that was originally designed for Brazil. VW now pushes the 
establishments of broad engineering competencies to be able to adapt cars to the 
specificities of the Chinese market.  
SAIC’s partnerships with GM and VW successfully promote technology 
transfer in auto-related industries in Shanghai. SAIC still needs its partners, because 
despite of being a longtime maker of commercial vehicles and components, it lacks 
the capital to develop a full line of cars, the up-to-date technology to ensure quality 
control, and the brand names needed to lure consumers. Although its ultimate target is 
to produce a China-designed and China-branded vehicle, SAIC, following the trend of 
globalization, will not sever its links with global partners for the purpose of 
technology advancement and foreign market access in the future. 
6.4.4. Technology Transfer: Good and Bad 
Scholars advocated that the existing supplier network and industrial 
infrastructure were important reasons why GM also decided to set up production 
facilities in Shanghai in 1997(Gallagher, 2005; Taylor III, 2004), while the later 
success of GM, to a large extent, is attributed to its sincere investment in local 
technology development and close cooperation with Chinese engineers. Nonetheless, 
problems could rise from inter-JV technology transfer. 
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GM was the first company that actually established a technical center with 
additional investment in Shanghai, following the government’s promotion of 
technology transfer in the 1994 industrial policy. A separate $50 million US joint 
venture was established between GM and SAIC named the Pan Asian Technical 
Center (PATAC). PATAC’s main purpose is to provide engineering support to SGM 
and other Chinese auto companies. PATAC has also established an in-house 
emissions testing center and has employed around 400 Chinese engineers, which, 
though not directly training Chinese engineers, gives China the opportunity to work 
closely with advanced techniques and learn in the process.  
PATAC’s contributions were apparent only two years after its establishment. 
SGM launched a compact sedan called the Buick Sai Ou (Sail) for private consumers 
in the growing Chinese middle class. While GM was the original technology provider, 
Chinese PATAC engineers completed most of the product adaptation process and 
SGM manufactured the Sai Ou with 70% local content. PATAC also works closely 
with SGM’s research labs in universities that conduct auto-related studies and request 
relevant adaptations. For example, engineers from PATAC and the Body 
Manufacturing Satellite Laboratory in Shanghai Jiaotong University conducted 
research on body manufacturing and technical design, such as adaptive strategy in 
auto-body assembly process, and process robustness of auto-body stamping. Their 
achievements are significant. The engineers reduced the body-in-white variations in 
Shanghai GM and Jinbei GM, developed the flow chart of body quality control, 
dimensions data analysis and variation root, and developed a database for local body 
materials (Shanghai General Motors, 2006). 
According to Porter (1990), only when a foreign company transfers R&D 
decisions can it add to the host nation’s competitiveness. The establishment of 
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PATAC is a good example of R&D decision transfer. The process of model 
adaptation and improvement can help Chinese engineers learn advanced technology 
and thus gain experience in whole car design and remodeling, which will ultimately 
contribute to the overall industry competitiveness. 
The bright side of working with joint venture partners is obvious, while the 
down side is that inter-firm technology transfer can hurt the feelings of both foreign 
partners. Although top management of SAIC, VW, and GM expressed confidence in 
their confidentiality agreements, people worry about the future of SAIC’s “two-hand 
partnership” because problems could arise if SAIC decides to take the technology it 
learned from one joint venture and apply it to another, or simply grab it for itself.  
As shown in the SAIC organizational chart in Figure 7, SAIC used to hold 
20% in Chery Automobile Co. but released its share in 2003 because of a suspicious 
pirating issue (Gong, 2004). The Chery QQ, a minicar manufactured by a Wuhu City 
company, was promoted as being an independently designed Chinese car, but GM 
said the car, especially its highlights and air-intake system, looked suspiciously like 
its own Chevy Spark, a small car built by SAIC and GM in Western China. Although 
no evidence showed that SAIC was involved in Chery’s model design, SAIC’s stake 
in Chery cast suspicion on its credibility with GM. 
As a developing country with limited industrialization experience, Chinese 
automakers have a long way to go in technology advancement so as to catch up with 
leading global auto firms. Government’s intent to exchange market access for 
technology aims at helping indigenous players speed up in the process. When global 
auto firms take an active attitude in transferring knowledge and technology into China, 
domestic automakers should value the foreign intellectual property while still working 
independently in developing technological competitiveness.  
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6.4.5. Government Involvement and Business Governance 
As one of the top auto business groups in China, SAIC’s administration is to a 
large extent directed by the government. The primary linkage between SAIC group 
and the government is at the level of top management. In the 1990s, SAIC’s president 
and top managers were appointed by the municipal government, who would also 
report to the state or local economic commissions. To achieve the objective of 
balanced growth within the group, top management oversaw the contribution of the 
auto industry to regional development, which in turn limited the ability of joint 
venture business governance. At the same time, the 50% equity regulation posted on 
MNEs restricted their power to improve administration efficiency—a problem to be 
solved by China’s WTO commitment. 
 The foreign equity limit and the government’s protective power created no 
pressure for competition between suppliers and thus discouraged their motivation for 
optimization. The municipal government could force the assembly plants to purchase 
components from local suppliers, and the suppliers knew that they would supply the 
assembly plant no matter how high their costs. The government did not care whether 
the profit was realized in the supply firms or at the assembly plants as long as it was 
in the SAIC family. It was like shifting money from its right pocket to its left. But 
such irregular purchasing decisions, without referring to global cost and quality 
benchmarking, constrained the production cost at a sub-optimal level.  
The government’s desire for balanced growth within the business group 
blurred the distinction between firms, which went against the competition for 
optimization rule. One interview with a representative from a supplier firm best 
illustrates the problem: 
If you are a stronger performer and are able to make a profit, you 
would quite likely be given a lower price for the component supplied 
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to the (auto assembly) plants. (Decreasing the strength of your balance 
sheet) and quite possibly would have workers transferred over from 
struggling firms (adding to the labor burden). Instead of competing for 
best price and best quality, suppliers would try to hide their profit and 
avoid being ‘mistreated’ within the group. Such unhealthy and unfair 
competition will do no good to the business group in the long run. 
 
It becomes apparent that government intervention could discourage the 
competing motion between firms, which creates no motivation for cost reduction. 
More seriously, firms would turn passive in improving production efficiency and 
highly dependent on government assistance, which goes against government’s 
original purpose in developing large auto groups. 
Thus, the government has agreed to reduce its power in business governance 
after the five-year transition period following China’s WTO accession. MNEs, given 
a more controlling stake, are expected to help improve the market efficiency by 
introducing their global benchmarking system. The result has yet to be seen, but we 
can reasonably expect large consolidation and rationalization activities in China’s 
auto sector.  
In conclusion, success of SAIC is the result of capitalizing on foreign 
technology and the ability to serve as system integrator within China, which is the 
strategy most Chinese auto groups employ to compete in the domestic market. In 
other words, MNEs following rigid government regulations contribute a lot to the 
development of China’s auto industry. SAIC’s current challenge is to build a 
sufficiently solid foundation to support its ambitious growth in both domestic and 
international markets, along with intensified domestic competition. That will mean 
strengthening its ties with VW and GM, optimizing its supply chain, and developing 
its own car business.  
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7. Discussion and Conclusion 
The rapid expansion of the auto industry in the emerging markets satisfies 
both governments and the MNEs. On the one hand, national governments expect 
exports, increased employment and a technological boost to the industry of the host 
countries. This explains the restrictions and investment incentives they introduce. On 
the other hand, the global auto assemblers are anxious to position themselves in 
growing auto markets in developing countries. These would provide overall scale to 
spread development costs, cheap production costs for selected vehicle and component 
developments, and new markets for higher-end vehicles produced in the advanced 
economies (Humphrey, 2003).  
The analysis of SAIC and its global partners demonstrate some important 
aspects of the current Chinese auto industry. By looking at the policy impact on 
supplier network and firm strategies, this study stresses the importance of government 
power in promoting the development of Porter’s competitiveness indicators.  
There have been three mainstream viewpoints on China’s auto industry 
development (Jing, 2005). At one end of the discussion, some suggest the idea of 
completely opening up the Chinese auto market. They state that the global auto 
market is dominated by several leading companies and China has no competitive 
advantage in either technology or resource advancement. Thus, the best way for China 
is to open up its auto market to global players, i.e. allowing wholly-owned foreign 
subsidiaries or foreign-controlled partnership, which is the method adopted by Brazil, 
Mexico, and Canada to develop their automobile sectors. However, this strategy was 
rejected not long after China’s initial development plan because the central 
government ultimately wants a China-designed and -branded auto vehicle for exports.  
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At the other extreme, people recognize the huge demand market and 
production capacity in China, and thus support the idea of self-reliance and self-
development, which is the technique Japan and Korea applied in their early 
developmental stages. This way of development seems attractive corresponding to 
China’s ambition for self-designed automobile, but is arguably premature after 
decades of development since the large knowledge gap limits the ability of domestic 
auto firms to independently design and manufacture quality auto vehicles.  
And finally, the majority of industry analysts and practitioners support the idea 
of equity-controlled partnerships with global auto firms, which proved a successful 
strategy in the late 1990s. China’s strategy is to exchange advanced technology and 
managerial skills for demand and factor markets. Though problems still exist (i.e. 
slow technology transfer and administrative conflict in equity joint ventures), this 
method has given rise to the prosperity in China’s auto industry since the 1990s.  
Analysis from the current study supports the above strategy—to build industry 
competitiveness on foreign partners’ knowledge; however, after China’s WTO 
accession, Chinese auto firms need to realize the threat brought in by a free market 
thus reduce its dependency on foreign technologies.  Jing’s (2005) discussion outlined 
a strategy for China auto industry in the 21st century. He dubbed the ultimate strategy 
for Chinese auto firms as “self-competitive”, which requires companies to extend 
production for exports, invest in R&D, and improve the supply chain efficiency. The 
government considers WTO membership an opportunity to revitalize the domestic 
auto industry while launching leading indigenous auto firms into the global market. 
As the government gradually reduces its power in the auto sector and as Chinese auto 
business groups approach global scale, China’s auto firms are expected to compete 
independently in both domestic and international markets.  
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7.1. Significance of Government Power in China’s Auto Market 
By controlling the entry of foreign firms into China, leveraging the foreign 
firm’s desire for market access into technology transfer, and then partnering these 
foreign firms with centrally sanctioned domestic firms, the central government gives 
dramatic advantage to a chosen few business groups. It is no coincidence that the 
three groups that are currently at the core of the central government’s focus each have 
at least two major foreign assembly partners: Dongfeng has Citröen and Nissan, FAW 
has VW and Toyota, and SAIC has VW and GM. One partner is good, but when there 
are two, the foreign partners will compete with each other via faster model 
introduction and cost reduction, which ultimately strengthens China’s auto industry 
competitiveness.  
The biggest issue currently facing the Chinese auto sector is the future of 
equity control in auto assembly operations. China’s WTO commitments do not 
include a timetable to eliminate equity controls in auto assembly facilities, and the 
Chinese government is expected to limit foreign equity ownership to no more than 
50% for some time. Multinational automakers with joint venture facilities in China 
have expressed their readiness to buy out their Chinese partners and will increasingly 
pressure the government to lift the cap on foreign ownership. Meanwhile, Chinese 
auto firms realize that cheap production cost and demand conditions cannot be the 
sustainable long-term competitiveness. Thus, they are designing new models and 
improving their supply chain management, aiming at entering the global market as a 
new separate entity. 
In sum, as China transitions to a free market, the government is expected to 
reduce its involvement in industry operation, and let the market promote competition 
and progression in the automobile industry. 
 86
7.2. Local Automakers Future Prospects 
Although a strategy based on global partnerships and cooperation might not 
have the patriotic appeal of a national champion strategy, there is the potential for 
high profits and technical upgrading, particularly in a country with the market appeal 
of China. With the policy support of both the central and local governments, firms can 
leverage the resources they develop in the domestic market into ever more influential 
role in the global production networks of which they are part (Lall, 2004). Thus, 
China’s WTO entry becomes an opportunity for Chinese auto groups to get access 
and independently compete in the global market. 
Almost all interviewees (two sales managers from different auto joint ventures, 
one representative from a parts supply firm, one parts import manager from Hainan 
Mazda Co. Ltd, one university professor, one auto magazine editor, and one 
consultant from an auto research institution) expressed concern about “disorderly” 
competition in the domestic marketplace, due to liberal industrial regulation and 
reduced government support after WTO accession. Power is predicted to shift toward 
international partners and thus the ultimate strategy for domestic automakers is to 
promote technological innovation in vehicle design and supply chain optimization. 
Interviewees’ comments on firms’ future strategy include: 
• Increasing R&D investment in whole car design and model adaptation. Large 
Chinese auto groups should maintain their learning process in established 
technical centers (such as the Pan Asian Technical Center in SGM). Besides, 
interviewees from research institutions suggest automakers diversify R&D 
channels by cooperating with local universities and business associations. 
• Achieving economy of scale by investment in new operations. Although 
Chinese auto groups mass produce motor vehicles now, total national auto 
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output in 2003 was less than half of GM’s global production. Large auto 
groups, in order to compete in the global market, still need to expand their 
production capacity and achieve global-standard economies of scale. 
• Building sophisticated and efficient supply networks. Whole car assemblers, 
first-tier suppliers (component specialists or system integrators), and material 
providers are expected to work cooperatively in optimizing the overall supply 
and logistic network.  
• Establishing distribution and service networks. Auto firms should improve 
their marketing strategy by not only providing quality products but also related 
services, such as financing, insurance, and auto maintenance. Diversified 
service demand and improved service network will also contribute to the 
overall industry competitiveness. 
• Recruiting and retaining qualified staff. Interviewees considered easy human 
capital movement a threat to domestic auto firms. Indigenous firms should 
learn from their global partners to maintain an employee-oriented culture and 
a functional open structure.  
China is currently a small exporter of automotive products—largely because it 
exports very few assembled vehicles. This situation may change in the near future. 
Honda, GM, and Toyota have plans to export vehicles from their Chinese facilities, a 
move that might become even more attractive with the substantial growth of surplus 
capacity in vehicle assembly in China (Humphrey, 2003). Moreover, China’s own 
automakers, particularly Geely, have ambitious plans to export to North American 
and European markets.  
A common problem in most Chinese auto joint ventures is that due to the 
intellectual property rights, sales of jointly developed vehicles are limited to the 
 88
domestic market. A sales manger from Hainan Mazda Co. Ltd offered an example of 
the current problem. The technology of the “Family” economy car model originated 
from Mazda Japan but after years of adaptation in the Chinese technical center, the 
model has been modified according to Chinese preference and has achieved a 75% 
localization rate. Several neighboring countries, such as Korea and Vietnam, 
expressed interest in importing the “Family” model while currently Hainan Mazda is 
not allowed to export vehicles under the Mazda brand name to other nations. This 
example demonstrates that China should develop its own branding for export in order 
to strengthen its international competitiveness. 
In sum, future study should note whether it is the exports from domestic auto 
groups with high local content rate or exports from MNEs plants merely located in 
China that do not contribute to the international competitiveness of Chinese auto 
industry in the long term. Currently, the government is promoting export from joint 
venture and indigenous firms so that both contribute to the nation’s international 
competitiveness in the transition period. 
7.3. Globalization of Component and Part Supply Market 
 As with other industrial sectors, China is becoming a key player in the auto 
industry. Two factors are of particular importance: first, China’s role as a market; 
second, China’s potential role as a significant exporter of components and assembled 
vehicles. Although WTO entry gives MNEs the opportunity to freely import 
components and sub-assemblies, carmakers may prefer domestic suppliers since they 
may consider the local sources of supply superior in terms of cost and quality, and 
they may desire to maintain healthy Chinese business relationships. This would 
suggest that the development of the local supply chain under local content restriction 
in the years prior to WTO entry had been successful. 
 89
The most urgent task for indigenous parts suppliers would be to improve their 
economy of scale and independent R&D capabilities. China’s over1,000 parts 
producers need to go through a long consolidation process, after which China can 
have several competitive parts suppliers with global standard costs, high production 
capacity, and advanced R&D capabilities. Only when domestic parts producers are 
able to create components on their own technology and experience can they upgrade 
themselves as global component specialists. 
Furthermore, domestic parts suppliers’ self improvement should be 
accompanied by an expeditious industry standardization process. Product quality of 
Chinese first-tier suppliers is at, or close to, world standards. The main challenge now 
facing the supply sector lies in the extension of international best practices (i.e. the 
steady improvement of quality through diagnosing defects by groups of operatives, 
and the organization of a coordinated inflow of materials and the outflow of finished 
products (Sutton, 2004)) to the second and third tier component suppliers.  
Finally, although China has few whole-car exports, a large amount of current 
auto product exports come out of the component and parts sector. Vehicle parts 
exports exceeded $4.4 million US in 2004 and ranked in China’s top 30 export 
industries (NBS, 2005). As shown in Table 20, indigenous parts producers (and their 
joint ventures with multinationals) dominate the top ten exporter positions. They aim 
to become global component specialists and get involved in the MNEs’ global 
sourcing network in the near future. Such ambition further encourages domestic parts 
producers to enhance research and production capacity, as well as promoting 
international best practices in the overall parts supply industry.  
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Table 20 Leading component exporters in China, 2003 
Multinational or 
Multinational JV 
(M) 
Domestic (D) 
Company 
 
Exports 
US 
Millions
Item Exported 
 
 
D China FAW Group 
Corporation 44.3
Various 
M Kunshan Liufeng 
Machinery Industry Co. 
Ltd. 
61.2
Aluminum alloy wheel 
hubs 
M Siemens VDO 
Automotive Huizhou Co. 
Ltd. 
44.6
Car radios 
* Wanxiang Qianchao Co. 
Ltd. 
43.0
Universal joint, 
bearings, drive shaft, 
constant velocity joint, 
rubber seal elements, 
ball bearings 
M Shanghai Yanfeng 
Johnson Controls Seats 
Co. Ltd. 
43.0
Covers and parts for 
seats 
D Guangzhou City Huanan 
Rubber Tire Co. Ltd. 41.4
Covers for radial tires 
D Zhejiang Wanfeng 
Autocar Group 29.8
Aluminum wheels 
D Shandong Longji Group 
Co. Ltd. 19.6
Brake drums; break 
discs 
D Xiang Torch Investment 
Co. Ltd. 19.0
Break discs, lights, 
mirrors, sparks, plugs 
D Fujian Yuanguang 
Combined Wire Co. Ltd. 18.7
Wiring harness 
Above 10 Total 364.6 million $   
Overall total parts 
export 
2,617.7 million $ 
  
Share of above 10 14%   
Note. * indicates a domestic firm with multiple foreign JV partners. CAAM, 2005. 
 
Through more than two decades of foreign cooperation, China has built up a 
complete auto manufacturing and supply network. The quality of indigenous 
automobiles (with mostly local content and design) is approaching global standards. 
Prior to China’s WTO accession, firm strategies (either forms of partnership or 
product mix) had been restricted by the government authorization process, and thus 
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the success of the project was often determined by the historical performance in China 
and relations with the government. In the future, it appears that commercial 
considerations will drive manufacturers’ product strategies and there will be less 
bureaucratic obstacles; this will then lead to further intensification of competition and 
greater consumer choices.  
In sum, WTO accession has had a critical impact on regulatory reform and 
internal restructuring in China’s motor vehicle sector. Such restructuring is 
represented by a cost reduction following consolidation and rationalization and the net 
result is a movement of costs towards global norms. With restructuring, the final 
assembly industry can become competitive by world standards, while the parts 
industry becomes further integrated into the global industry through exports. China 
aims at exporting to the global auto market in order to improve its international 
competitiveness, whereas before it can achieve this goal, both indigenous auto 
assemblers and parts suppliers should upgrade themselves into global standard 
production capacity and research capability. We are looking forward to seeing the 
growth of China’s automobile industry. 
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8. Limitations and Future Research 
There are several limitations in this study that can be addressed in future 
research. First, this project includes a large amount of general information about 
China’s automobile industry but provides limited analysis of the industry 
development from a theoretical standpoint. Measurements for industry 
competitiveness are analyzed in a descriptive manner instead of analytical methods. 
Thus, to further understand the industry, future study can incorporate more specific 
measurements on primary data, and draw conclusions on the interrelationship between 
theoretical indicators.  
Secondly, analyses of firm strategy and related industries are conducted from 
the Chinese perspective. For example, when looking at SAIC’s future strategy, some 
scholars predicted that SAIC will terminate its partnership with VW and GM when it 
is able to compete independently in the global market. However, global auto firms 
could adapt their strategy and take over the Chinese market as China moves toward a 
free market economy. Future studies can incorporate the strategic changes in both 
sides and predict the power balance between Chinese and global auto firms.  
Similarly, conclusions of the competitiveness of China’s auto industry are 
drawn mostly from Chinese data, which, due to the low internationalization rate, is 
limited to the domestic market. Once China gets more involved in the international 
auto industry, analysis of the industry’s global competitiveness should incorporate 
more export-related measures. For example, demand conditions should not only 
address domestic customer needs but also include the auto quality and performance 
demands in target exporting market. Meanwhile, a comparison between China and 
other developing nations (with similar economic conditions and ambition in 
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promoting national auto industry, such as Mexico or Brazil) could offer further 
insights on China’s competitive position on a world scale. 
Though not directly explored in the current study, unrevealed social ties within 
the Chinese culture seem to play a significant role in business operations, such as the 
involvement of government in business administration and the communication 
channels among indigenous auto suppliers. Future study could look at the impact of 
social networks on business performance and strategy in China.  
And finally, relative to government involvement, researches have showed that 
regional and local authorities may also provide support or present obstacles beyond 
the national government (Eun & Lee, 2002; Harwit, 1995; Qin, 2004). Future research 
could specifically analyze policy reforms and automakers’ strategy changes in 
response to multi-level authorities in China. Upon finishing the five year transition 
period, China is required to implement all terms specified in the WTO agreement in 
2006. Future studies can incorporate updated data and conduct a longitudinal study of 
China’s development in the auto sector.  
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Appendix A Proposed Measurements and Levels of analysis 
Determinants Measurements Methodology Source 
Top Chinese industries in terms of export 
value 
To identify and compare competitive 
positions of auto industry in China and world 
export market 
Porter, 1990; 
Ravenhill, 2005 
Annual growth of GDP percentage National competitive improvement Namaki, 2002 
Total vehicle output and Trade balance in 
auto industry 
As a percentage of world total, to identify 
international global competitive position 
Porter, 1990; 
Namaki, 2002 
FDI utilization in China per industry To identify the portion of FDI in auto industry 
and its contribution 
Lin & Lin, 2001 
General 
competitiveness 
Export of autos as percentage of national 
export 
Measure auto industry contribution to overall 
national competitiveness 
Porter, 1990 
Investment in basic infrastructure As percentage of GDP expenditure By 
classifications 
Barclay & Gray, 
2001 
Technological advancement Descriptive data, research specific in auto 
industry 
Barclay & Gray, 
2001 
R&D expenditure in auto industry To identify and analyze R&D investment as 
percentage of sales revenues 
Barclay & Gray, 
2001 
Labor market classified by education levels 
Wages and salaries of labors 
Auto productivity increases 
To calculate percentage and wage changes in 
skilled-labor market 
Porter, 1990; Barclay 
& Gray, 2001 
Monetary policy changes To analyze capital market relaxation (i.e. 
exchange rate, inflation, interest rate) 
Greenwood, 2001 
Factor 
conditions 
Regulation on capital investment  Descriptive data, to identify availability of 
funds and the freedom of capital market  
Huo & McKinley, 
1992 
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Regulation of MNEs in financial market  To discover availability auto loans provided 
by MNEs 
Greenwood, 2001 
Population and private vehicle possession 
rate 
To discover demand market size and 
distribution 
Fan & Scott,2003 
Auto market composition To identify opportunity in passenger car 
market 
Huo & McKinley, 
1992 
Personal saving rate To identify government impact on domestic 
capital market 
Greenwood, 2001 
Demand 
conditions 
Average income level in major cities/ per 
capita income 
To identify potential markets for vehicles in 
different price ranges 
Porter, 1990; Huo & 
McKinley, 1992 
List of domestic suppliers, joint ventures 
and foreign suppliers, and supplier size of 
each 
To identify major suppliers (specific for case 
study) 
Martin, Mitchell, & 
Swaminathan, 1995 
Geographic concentration of auto industry 
in China (assemblers and part suppliers) 
For future implication into industry cluster Fan & Scott , 2003 
Policy changes in auto industry  Descriptive data, changes from 1994 
industrial policy to WTO agreement 
Sit & Liu, 2000; Lai, 
2003 
Related and 
supporting 
industries 
WTO agreement on removal of trade 
barriers, forms of alliance and other reform 
in auto industry 
Same as above Zhang, 2003 
List of major auto groups in China Identify major competitors in China’s whole 
car assembly market 
Sit & Liu, 2000 
Market share of each Percentage in whole car assembly market  Luo, 2002 
Production capability  Actual amount Sit & Liu, 2000 
Major models Number of major models Sit & Liu, 2000 
Domestic sales As percentage of total sales Luo, 2002 
Firm strategy, 
structure and 
rivalry 
Profitability Total revenue/total sales Luo, 2002 
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Specific to the joint ventures, percentage of 
shares controlled by MNEs 
To identify power changes pre- and post-
WTO accession between MNEs and 
indigenous automakers 
Porter, 1990; Luo, 
2002 
MNEs and indigenous automakers strategic 
differences 
Descriptive data to identify rivalry and 
partner strategy differences 
London & Hart, 
2004 
Government control and policy changes on 
competition 
Changes of government share and control in 
major alliances 
Chen, 2004 
The impact of WTO on firm strategy and 
structure 
Descriptive data, to discover power changes 
between indigenous and foreign auto firms 
Breslin, 2004 
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Appendix B Qualitative Research Documents Summary 
Legend for types  
A: academic research, C: company report, G: government report, IA: industry association, 
and TR: trade journal or magazine. 
 
Type Author & Year Document Title 
A Agarwal & Wu 
2004 
China’s entry to WTO: global marketing issues, impact, and 
implications for China. 
A Ali et al., 2004 World Trade Organization (WTO) and the response of vehicle 
manufacturers in China: a comparative study. 
G Anonymous, 
2001 
The middle class and the emergence of a consumer culture. 
TR Anonymous, 
2005 
Shanghai GM’s: incorporated globalized domestic supply chain 
system. 
TR Asia Times, 
2005 
Mixed outlook seen for auto exports. 
A Breslin, 2004 Globalization, international coalitions, and domestic reform. 
IA CAAM,  2005 Major automobile enterprise in China. 
IA CAAM, 2002 Automobile industry analysis and development forecast of 2003. 
IA CATARC, 2004 2003 World Automotive Statistics Yearbook. 
A Chen 2002 The structure of Chinese industry and the impact from China’s 
WTO entry. 
IA China 
Automotive 
Yearbook, 
various year 
China Automotive Yearbook, 1986-2005 
A Depner & 
Bathelt, 2005 
Exporting the German model: the establishment of a new 
automobile industry cluster in Shanghai. 
A Eun and Lee, 
2002 
Is an industrial policy possible in China? The case of the 
automobile industry. 
A Fan & Scott, 
2003 
Industrial agglomeration and development: A survey of spatial 
economic issues in East Asia and a statistical analysis of Chinese 
regions. 
A Francois & 
Spinanger, 2004   
Regulated efficiency, World Trade Organization accession, and 
the motor vehicle sector in China. 
A Gallagher, 2005 Foreign technology in China’s automobile industry: Implication 
for energy, economic development, and environment. 
TR Gao, 2002 A tune-up for China’s auto industry. 
TR Gong, 2004 GM charges Chery for alleged mini car piracy. 
A Han & Kim, 
2003 
FDI environment and policy competitiveness of Asia Pacific 
economies. 
A Harwit, 1995 China’s automobile industry: policies, problems, and prospects. 
TR Humphrey, 
2003 
Globalization and supply chain network: the auto industry in 
Brazil and India.  
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Type Author & Year Document Title 
A Hutchings & 
Michailova, 
2004 
Facilitating knowledge sharing in Russian and Chinese 
subsidiaries: the role of personal networks and group 
membership.  
IA Invest in China 
2005 
Guiding manual on applications regarding foreign invested 
commercial (distribution) enterprises. 
IA Invest in China 
2006 
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Appendix C Invitation Letter and Consent Form 
October 12, 2006 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
Re: Competitiveness of China’s Auto industry study 
 
My name is Di Wu and I am a Chinese student working on my Master of Science thesis 
at the University of Lethbridge Alberta, Canada. I would like to invite you to participate 
in a telephone interview for my research project on the competitive advantage of Chinese 
automobile industry. 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the competitive positions of domestic 
automakers, as well as the sources of competitiveness of the entire industry, such as 
related supporting industries, labor market, technology and managerial skill transfer, etc. 
Particularly in China, as government plays an important role in stimulating and regulating 
the overall market, the study is also intended to understand the contribution and limitation 
of current policies in auto sector. 
 
Your participation will add significant value to the study of China’s auto market. The 
benefits of this project are primarily academic but may have both policy and practical 
implications. Your participation in the interview is entirely voluntary. You have the right 
to not participate or not answer certain questions with no consequences. All the 
information received from you and your company/institution will be kept anonymous and 
confidential. The telephone interview will take approximately 40—60 minutes. If you are 
interested in the final findings of my research, you can contact me or my supervisor (by 
phone or by email) and request a copy of my thesis by the end of September 2006.  
 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the University of Lethbridge Human 
Subject Research Committee. The study conforms to acceptable ethical guidelines and 
standards as described in the Tri-Council Policy Statement for ethical conduct of research 
involving humans. Questions regarding your rights as a participant in this research may 
be addressed to the Office of Research Services, University of Lethbridge (Phone:  403-
329-2747). 
 
I am looking forward to listening to your significant insights on China’s auto industry! 
 
Sincerely,  
 
Di Wu MSc (Management) Candidate Tel: 1-403-332-4369 di.wu@uleth.ca  
Bradley Olson Thesis supervisor Tel: 1-403-329-2134 bradley.olson@uleth.ca  
 
If you think you do not have the information I request, I will really appreciate if you can 
introduce me to the people in your organization who have the full information.  
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Appendix D Interview Guide* 
Group classification questions 
 
1. Which group heading best describes your position in Chinese auto industry? 
a) Scholars in research institution specialized in auto industry 
b) Government staff 
c) Representatives from auto assembly plants in China 
d) Suppliers or distributors 
 
General questions for all interviewees 
 
2. What are, in general term, the strength, weakness, opportunity, and threat in 
Chinese auto market? 
a) Demand condition 
b) Basic factor conditions (natural resource, labor, and infrastructure) 
c) Advanced factor conditions (technology, financial resource, and quality 
and environmental standard) 
d) Suppliers and distributors in the value chain 
e) Domestic competitions  
f) Policy and/or regulations 
3. What significant changes do you recognize in auto sector after WTO accession? 
a) Policy changes toward domestic and multinational automakers and 
suppliers 
b) Improvement in basic infrastructure  
c) Cluster development in major coastal industrial areas 
d) Financial infrastructure development 
e) Domestic competition 
f) Contribution of auto industry in national prosperity 
g) Others 
4. What government can do to improve national competitiveness in auto sector? 
a) Development of supporting infrastructure 
b) Incentives to R&D institutions  
c) Capital market support 
d) Industrial policy reform 
 
Question for personnel from research institutions 
 
5. How do you describe the link between research institutions and auto assemblers 
and suppliers?  
a) Close link with research institutions 
b) Established their own R&D and training center 
c) Still depend on foreign technology and skills 
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Questions specific for personnel from auto assembly plants, suppliers or distributing 
organizations 
 
6. What are the advantages of indigenous suppliers? If possible, please give an 
example. 
a) Cost efficiency 
b) Quality control 
c) Production capacity 
d) Managerial skills 
e) Technology advancement, network alignment  
f) Partnership with global parts suppliers  
g) Understanding domestic supply market 
h) Others 
 
7. What are the disadvantages of indigenous suppliers? (Please choose from options 
in previous question and briefly explain) 
 
8. Is there anything else you think missed in my questions but is important to 
understand the competitiveness of China’s auto industry?  
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
 
 
 
*Interview questions are adopted from Porter’s original questionnaire in The competitive 
advantages of nations (1990), and Barragan’s study on Mexican automobile industry 
(2005).  
 
 
